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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
THE MINORITY ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF TURKISH-EU RELATIONS 
Ercan Laçin 
Master’s Thesis, Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Dr. Aylin Güney 
 
September 2002 
 
For 200 years, Turkey has moved towards the West. Membership in the 
European Union (EU) forms the apogee of this endeavor. The European Helsinki 
Summit can be considered as the institutionalization of this process and Turkey-EU 
relations. As a natural consequence of this, the EU started to closely monitor the 
political and economic life in Turkey. In other words, there are economic and 
political criteria for Turkey to fulfill. However, there are problems regarding these 
criteria and these problematic areas are various on the way to accession. This thesis 
considers the issue of minority protection under the heading of political criteria, 
which is one of the above-mentioned problematic areas. In other words, this thesis 
examines the perceptions and the gap between the perceptions of Turkey and the EU 
towards the issue of minority rights, an issue which continues to threaten Turkey’s 
accession to full EU membership.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
TURKİYE-AB İLİŞKİLERİ BAĞLAMINDA AZINLIK KONUSU 
Ercan Laçin 
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Dr. Aylin Güney 
 
Eylül 2002 
 
Türkiye 200 yıldır Batı doğrultusunda ilerlemektedir. Bu gayretin doruk 
noktasını da Avrupa Birliği (AB) üyeliği oluşturmaktadır.1999 Helsinki Zirvesi bu 
sürecin ve Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin kurumsallaşması olarak algılanabilir. Bu 
gelişmenin doğal bir sonucu olarak AB Türkiye’nin ekonomik ve siyasi hayatını 
yakından gözetim altına almaya başlamıştır. Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye’nin yerine 
getirmek durumunda olduğu ekonomik ve siyasi ölçütler mevcuttur. Diğer taraftan, 
bu ölçütler göz önüne alındığında çeşitli problemler baş göstermektedir ve 
günümüzde katılım sürecinde de bu sıkıntılı ve sorunlu alanlar çeşitlilik arz 
etmektedir. Bu tez, yukarıda belirtilen problemli alanlardan biri olan azınlıkların 
korunması konusunu ele almaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, bu tez, Türkiye’nin AB 
adaylığına tehdit oluşturan azınlık hakları konusuna Türkiye’nin ve AB’nin bakış 
açılarını ve bu bakış açılarının arasındaki farkı nedenleriyle incelemektedir.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkey-European Union (EU) relations go back to the period when the Ottoman 
Empire started to lose its superiority in Europe and to the period when modernization 
or westernization movements started. Therefore, the modernization attempts in the 
Ottoman period such as the Tanzimat reforms and the reforms made by Atatürk in 
the Republican period can be considered as pioneers of the spirit of modernization or 
westernization. In this regard, since the beginning, Turkey’s European orientation 
has been a strategic objective of both Ottoman and Turkish foreign policy and must 
be seen as an integral part of the modernization process Turkey has been following. 
This objective became one step closer by Turkey’s becoming a candidate state for the 
Union. After a tortuous process, Turkey was finally acknowledged as an official 
candidate country by the European Union at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. 
Centuries of relations with Europe became more and more institutionalized with the 
Helsinki Summit. However, it is a fact that the relations between Turkey and the EU 
have always been in constant fluctuation. In other words, Turkey-EU relations have 
always been rough and problematic. The relations between the two have been 
characterized as problematic because the problems show up in different spheres and 
they are hard to solve. This study takes the minority issue as one of the major areas 
of difficulty and aims at getting to the core of the problem by showing the 
differentiation of perceptions as well as the reasons for this differentiation.    
 
It is obvious that in the process of Turkey’s integration into the EU, the Union has 
made demands of Turkey with respect to its history, understanding, application and 
perceptions. On the other side, the responses of Turkey towards these demands have 
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always been limited because of her own perceptions and realities. In order to present 
this problematique, in the first part of this work, the understanding of minority in the 
West will be evaluated. This evaluation in the first part is in a legal sense. The aim of 
the first part to is reveal what the definition and understanding of minority in 
fundamental documents and declarations in Western history is. In this regard, the 
effect of the French Revolution is mentioned as the starting point of the debate on 
minority and minority rights. The French Revolution brought the “ancien regime” to 
an end and helped the proliferation of Liberal thought, which later provided the basis 
for the concept of minority rights. It will be argued in this part that these 
developments proliferated the ideas of nationalism and the nation-state and the issue 
of human rights and particularly minority rights gained importance in the 20th 
century after the First World War and especially after the Second World War. In this 
respect, in the first part of this work, the legal bases for the concept of a minority, 
minority rights and the protection of minorities will be dealt with having reference to 
the League of Nations, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and the OSCE.  
 
The second part of the work also focuses on the evolution of the concept of minority 
in Europe. However, this part focuses on the theoretical framework of the minority 
issue. The second part will aim to demonstrate that the current Liberal thought in 
Europe is in compliance with the minority discourse. Liberal thought, on the one 
hand favors freedom, individualism and individual rights, but on the other hand it 
shows a shift towards the protection of group rights acting in conformity with the 
necessities of the changing world. In this regard, the 17th and 18th century 
philosophies, which basically focused on individual liberty and freedom, and later 
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the development of the nation-state and the shift in Liberal thought, in which not 
only individual rights but also the rights of the communities are recognized, will be 
focused on as two basic points in shaping the understanding of the Western world on 
the issue of the protection of minorities.  
 
In the third part, the focus turns to the Turkish perception of the concept of minority. 
In order to give the application of minority protection in Turkey, two important legal 
documents will be analyzed, the Treaty of Lausanne and the Turkish constitution. 
These two documents are taken as the basis for today’s application in minority 
protection and also as the basis to for the monolithic understanding of citizenship in 
Turkey. Additionally, in the third chapter, it will be argued that this kind of an 
understanding also has an historical explanation and in this regard, the Ottoman 
heritage, the strong state tradition and Atatürk’s vision will be taken as the historical 
facts leading to an understanding of citizenship.   
 
In the final chapter, in order to have a clear understanding of the differentiation of 
perceptions towards the minority issue between Turkey and the European Union, 
citizenship application in the Union is examined with reference to basic agreements 
of the Union, namely the Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Shengen Agreements. In 
the second part of the final chapter, the expectations of the Union from Turkey will 
be examined and it will be mentioned that in the integration process, the expectations 
of the EU that are in compliance with its historical realities and traditions and the 
multicultural tradition are at odds with Turkish perceptions and traditions. The aim of 
the final chapter is to show the gap between Turkey and the European Union as 
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regards protection of minority rights by comparing the expectations of the Union and 
the capacity of Turkey to assume the obligations for membership.  
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CHAPTER  I 
 
 
“MINORITY” AND “MINORITY RIGHTS” IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
1.1 The Concept of Minority 
 
The term “minority”, as a concept, is a very broad term, which is used in order to 
define a group that is not dominant and that has some particular features in a specific 
society. According to Claude (1969: 1), the rise of the term minority “was the logical 
consequence of the doctrinal ascendancy of nationalism in Western Europe, which 
was produced largely by the upheavals associated with the French Revolution”. With 
the emergence of the nation-state and nationalism, the ideas such as the “state should 
be nationally homogeneous”, and “the nation should be politically united” emerged. 
Therefore, as Claude (1969) states, the problem of national minorities appeared from 
the conflict between the idea of the homogeneous national state and the reality of 
ethnic heterogeneity. It is this distinction or division which makes national minorities 
more visible in the international arena. In other words, we cannot talk about national 
minorities before the formation of the nation-state. There were only religious 
minorities before the emergence of nation-states and the protection of these 
minorities was not a debatable issue then.  
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In the 18th and 19th centuries, when the nation-state emerged and developed was not a 
favorable time for the protection of minorities. It is true that the concept of minority 
became visible with the emergence of the nation-state, but one cannot talk about a 
successful protection of minority rights. The concept of minority developed and 
minorities became visible, but they were not really deemed as national minorities. In 
order to witness a real protection and supervision of the concept of minority rights, 
one must wait until the First World War. Some agreements and treaties were signed 
about minorities; however, these did not have any supervision or sanction. Therefore, 
as Claude states (1969: 8)  “There was a fatal lack of machinery for the supervision 
of the treatment of minorities” in the 19th century. The recognition of national 
minorities coincides both with the emergence and strengthening of the ideas of 
nation-state and nationalism, however, this does not mean that they are protected. 
The protection of minorities and “the problem of how to deal with 
minorities…became one of the primary political concerns after the war of 1914-18” 
(Miall, 1994: 23). Therefore, it can be argued that the very concept of minority goes 
hand in hand with their protection. Protection requires granting of specific rights to 
minorities, and the power to implement them, since, “rights do not exist where the 
power to enforce those rights is absent” (Watson, 1990: 168).  
 
1.1.1 Historical Background of the Concept of Minority 
In the Middle Ages, there were no minorities and minority rights because the Church 
was extremely dominant and there was a great religious unity in many societies. 
Therefore, we cannot even talk about religious minorities in the Middle Ages. The 
term religious minority emerged with the Reformation period and later developed 
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and took its shape as we understand it today. And later, “religious minorities” or the 
concept of the minority changed with the emergence of nation-state and “national 
minorities” emerged. 
 
When we make a brief historical study of minorities starting from the 16th century, 
one can realize that the 16th and 17th centuries were the centuries when religion and 
religious differentiations were dominant. Therefore, the term “religious minorities” 
coincides with this era. Though the term “religious minority” was used in this era, 
the actual practice of these rights was poor. That is to say, the members of these 
religious minorities did not have a say in the public arena. The members of religious 
minorities did not have any power to express their rights and to make their voices 
heard.  
 
In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Church started to lose its strength. The Church and 
powerful monarchies, which were able to satisfy the needs of the people in the 16th 
and 17th centuries, could not fulfill these needs and expectations in 18th and 19th 
centuries. In order to fill this gap, “during the 19th century, there appears to have 
been a general shift towards the recognition of peoples and classes as primary 
political and social entities to which the individual belonged” (Miall, 1994: 22-23). 
In addition, as Hadden states, during these days new science and sociology focused 
their attention on concepts related to group psychology1. Therefore people started to 
be interested in differentiated groups in societies and the intention was to explore 
                                                          
1 See in Miall, Hugh. 1994. Minority Rights in Europe. 
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their needs and aspirations. Consequently, “the first minority protection treaties were 
negotiated towards the end of the nineteenth century” (Miall, 1994: 23).  
 
This transformation or shift regarding the notion of minority is the result of the 
emergence of the nation-state. The driving forces of the emergence of nationalism 
and the nation-state should not be underestimated. This transformation had been 
vastly affected by the French Revolution, which proliferated the notions of 
nationalism, the nation and the individual. These notions focused attention on the 
nation and the elements of the nation. Therefore, national minorities as we 
understand them today started to be recognized.  
 
After the French Revolution, the French National Assembly promulgated a document 
stating the rights of the citizen. This was The Declaration of the Rights of Men and 
the Citizen. It is considered a fundamental document of French constitutional 
history2. It cannot be denied that the framers of this declaration were much 
influenced by the American Declaration of Independence3. The French declaration 
listed the “inalienable rights” of the individual. The rights to “liberty, property, 
security, and resistance to oppression” 4 and the rights to freedom of speech and of 
                                                          
2 This declaration was drafted by Emmanuel Sieyès, adopted by the Constituent Assembly on August 
26, 1789, and embodied in the French constitution of 1791 as a Preamble. 
 
3 With this Declaration, 13 colonies in the Northern America declared their independence from Britain 
and also declared that they established United States of America on July 4, 1776. The nature of the 
declaration is that all people are born and live free, and the state exists in order to protect these 
freedoms and to  ensure that each person has the ability to use them equally. 
 
4 The second article of the Declaration states that : The aim of all political association is the 
preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, 
security, and resistance to oppression. 
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the press were guaranteed 5. The document asserted the equality of men and the 
sovereignty of the people, on whom the law should rest, to whom officials should be 
responsible, and by whom finances should be controlled. Many of its provisions were 
aimed at eliminating specific abuses of the “ancien régime”. So, it can be considered 
as the end of the “ancien régime” and the declaration had an immense effect on the 
proliferation of liberal thought in the 19th century. 
 
This effect of liberal thought in the 19th century also extended to the 20th century. 
This reflection and the heritage of the 19th century brought some significant 
developments in the consolidation of the notion of human rights and also the notion 
of minority rights. Therefore it would not be wrong to claim that 17th and 18th 
century philosophies which basically focused on individual liberty and freedom, and 
the French Revolution, which proliferated the ideas of nationalism and the nation-
state had a great impact on 20th century philosophy and developments regarding 
human rights in general and minority rights in particular.  
 
The issue of human rights, particularly minority rights gained great importance in the 
20th century after the First World War and especially after the Second World War. 
That is to say, “the story of the international treatment of the problem of national 
minorities effectively begins with the creation of the League of Nations” (Claude, 
1969: 4), and more importantly, “the Second World War prompted the 
                                                          
5 The article 11 potects the freedom of speech and the freedom of press: The free communication of 
ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may,accordingly, 
speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall 
be defined by law. 
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universalization and therewith the – in historical context- radicalization of the legal 
subject of human rights” (Fottrell and Bowring, 1999: 27).  
 
1.1.2 The Minority Issue After the First World War 
Hadden believes that it is after the First World War that the protection of minorities 
and the minority problem became a hot issue in the agenda of international relations6. 
After the War, in order not to face the same disasters and losses on the European 
Continent, a new system was created under the League of Nations. The League of 
Nations system established after the War was based on specific treaties dealing with 
specific situations. Thornberry (1991: 41-42) lists the specific cases that the League 
of Nations system regulated such as: “minorities in Poland, minorities in Austria, in 
Serb-Croat-Slovene State, in Czechoslovakia, in Bulgaria, in Romania, in Hungary, 
in Greece, minorities in Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Iraq, minorities in 
Turkey and Greece and minorities in the territory of Memel”. Therefore, “the whole 
concept of minority rights was originally established by treaty: that is to say, by the 
treaties signed between the Allied and associated Powers and the new national states 
of Eastern Europe after the First World War”(Whitaker, 1984: 7).  
 
These treaties were made in order to redraw the map of Europe. Thornberry (1991) 
believes that, European Powers aimed to apply the principle of self-determination, to 
dismember the Austro-Hungarian Empire, to create new states and to include 
additional territory to others. In the above-mentioned cases and in the treaties 
regarding them, in other words in the framework of the League of Nations, we can 
                                                          
6 See in Miall, Hugh. 1994. Minority Rights in Europe. 
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recognize that the borders of the nations were changed by the Allied Forces, and 
attempts were made to solve issues regarding minority problems either by changing 
borders or by exchanging populations. 
 
The main success of the system of the League of Nations was its acknowledgement 
that minorities do exist.  They were considered as real and visible components of 
societies in this system. As John Packer7 stresses, there were bilateral treaties 
providing rules determining the belongings of some specific individuals. Moreover, 
he believes that these measures were taken in order to protect certain communities 
whose members shared an “identity” and a “sentiment of solidarity”. Some positive 
rights were given to these groups of people regarding language, education and 
cultural activities in these treaties. For example, freedom of education is given to the 
religious minorities in Turkey with the Treaty of Laussanne8. The education in 
minority schools is held in their mother language as well as Turkish. Claude (1969: 
19) argues that, “these positive privileges constituted the raison d’etre of the 
system”.  
 
Although one of the major aims of the League of Nation system was to solve the 
problems of minorities in some specific problematic areas, “the system established 
under the League of Nations was far from perfect” (Brölman, 1993: 82), and it later 
failed to cope with the existing problems. The League system “coped with everyday 
                                                          
7 See in Fortrell, Diedre and Browring Bill. 1999. Minority And Group Rights In The New Millenium. 
 
8 See in Treaty of Lausanne, Article 41. 
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frictions, but failed to solve wider problems (Thornberry: 1991: 46). First of all, the 
treaties made between the loser nations were bilateral agreements and they were 
imposed on a limited number of nations. In this regard, one cannot talk about an 
internationally and universally applied system of minority protection. The scope of 
the treaties was very limited and specific. Secondly, the impact of the great powers in 
the League cannot be underestimated over the treaties. Thornberry (1991) believes 
that this system denies the principle of sovereign equality between the nations and it 
constitutes a threat to the international stability. Parallel to this argument, Claude 
(1969: 32) states that, the League system “imposed restraints upon a limited number 
of states” and these states considered it as a discriminatory and unjust plan and an 
insult to the dignity of sovereign states.  
 
Therefore, on the one hand, the importance of minorities under the League of 
Nations cannot be denied, on the other, the failure of the system of the League of 
Nations is another fact that cannot be underestimated. This system was not able to 
avoid the eruption of the Second World War.  
 
1.1.3 The Minority Issue After the Second World War  
After the Second World War, the international arena attached more importance to the 
issue of minority rights, and their direction was different. The main focus was on the 
concept of human rights. In the protection of minority rights, human rights were 
chosen as a strategy. After the Second World War “the attention shifted back again to 
the identification of individual human rights” (Miall, 1994: 23). Similarly, Oliver 
states that, “international recognition of human rights owe much to the situation 
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following to Second World War”9. He adds that, after the War, the Soviet block and 
the new nations became unenthusiastic about the enforcement of human rights in 
general and minority rights in particular. It was the intention of the developed 
countries, however, to have advancement in this field.  
 
There were several major supranational organizations established after the war, such 
as the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (COE), the European Union (EU) 
and the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and they all 
attached great importance to the protection of human rights. They attached 
importance to the protection of minority rights especially under the heading of 
human rights. Several problems in the world could be the reason for this special 
focus to the concept of human rights. For instance, “certain American Negro groups, 
Jews in Germany and elsewhere, Algerian Muslims in France, and Catholics in 
Northern Ireland” (Whitaker, 1984: 14) are some of the problems that world politics 
had to deal with.  Moreover, they were problems which could be solved neither by 
domestic law nor by bilateral treaties. New protections were needed in order to cope 
with the existing problems, and most importantly, these protections should be 
universal and internationally accepted. “The UN Declaration, for instance, is 
universal and put forward as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and 
all nations” (Watson, 1990: 169-170). That is to say, after the Second World War, 
international actors decided to take more visible steps in the name of human rights in 
order to achieve a solution to existing problems. 
 
 
                                                          
9 See in Whitaker, Ben. 1984. Minorities A Question of Human Rights?p:8. 
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1.1.3.1 Minorities Under the UN 
The Second World War put an end to the system established by the League of 
Nations. A new system was created under the United Nations (UN). The 
establishment of the UN brought a different approach to the minority issue. “The 
United Nations system is completely different, emphasizing respect for individual 
human rights (including especially the principle of non-discrimination) in all states” 
(Fottrell and Bowring, 1999: 233). The United Nations Charter, which is the 
founding document of the organization, does not contain any mention of minority 
and minority rights. Individual human rights and the notion of non-discrimination are 
emphasized in the Charter. Therefore, as Miall (1994) states, non-discrimination on 
racial, ethnic, religious and other grounds was considered sufficient for human rights 
and for the protection of minorities. The First Article of the Charter states that one of 
the aims of the UN is to be non-discriminative in nature “to achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion”10. In addition, a number of articles protect minority rights with reference to 
preventing discrimination against the differentiated groups11.  
 
After the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the 
most significant document in the field of human rights. Similar to the United Nations 
                                                          
10 The United Nations Charter, Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 3. 
 
11 For example in Article 55.c. it is stated that there should be universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion. 
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Charter, the UDHR (1950) “does not make any reference to minorities, though it 
does refer to the principles of non-discrimination and non-distinction” (Thornberry, 
1991: 133). Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and the Article 2 of the UDHR 
contain similar provisions about the protection of minorities against discrimination 
12. The focus is on the elimination of discrimination. There should not be any 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, language or religion. The protection of the 
rights of minorities can be achieved by adopting these kinds of provisions under the 
UN.  
 
It is apparent that the UN attaches great importance to non-discrimination in the field 
of the protection of minorities. The UN Convention of Genocide (1948), The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on 
Economic and Social Rights are other documents which address the minority issue 
and “which are still individualistic in their nature” (Fottrell and Bowring, 1999: 29).  
 
 In 1990’s, the UN started to stress specific minority rights. This stress or emphasis 
occurred because of the changing environment in the world. The end of the Cold 
War, and following this development the collapse of the communist block and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states were the major 
developments of the era. These developments consequently, brought additional 
minority problems on to the agenda. The collapse of the Soviet empire “forced the 
                                                          
12The Second Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that;  “Everyone is entitled 
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,  
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty”. 
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issue of minority rights back into the forefront of the international political and 
human rights agenda” (Miall, 1994: 24). Correspondingly, Smith (1992: 1) states 
that, there are “growing convergence in two fields: the study of ethnicity and ethnic 
community, and the analysis of national identity and nationalism”. Movements for 
language revival developed in the 1960s and 1970s in Catalonia, the Basque 
Country, Wales, Brittany and Languedoc” (Watson, 1990: 186) and also, the ethnic 
revival in the West such as in Basque, Catalan, Breton, Flemish, Scots and Welsh 
ethnic groups led to a reassessment of both ethnicity and nationalism (Smith, 1992). 
Under these circumstances, a more effective regulation of minority problem came on 
to the agenda.  
 
Parallel to these developments, in December 1992, the UN ratified the Declaration 
on the Rights of the People Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities. This declaration stresses the need for the protection and the development 
of religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities. It also stresses that this kind of 
protection leads to international peace as well as political and social stability of a 
given state. The first article of this declaration states that, “The States are going to 
protect the ethnic, religious and linguistic identities of the minorities” and also “are 
going to provide the necessary conditions and hold the legal regulations for this 
aim”. In the same declaration, the minorities are given the rights to develop their own 
culture, to use their language in both public and private, to participate in the 
economic, political and social life without any discrimination, and to form 
associations. Besides the rights given to minorities, the states are given some 
obligations about the protection of these rights. States are to provide the legal bases 
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for the protection of minority rights (Article 2). They have to make people equal 
before the law without any discrimination (Article 4). The same article also states 
that, the states are to provide the conditions in order for minorities to learn and to 
improve their mother languages and to have further education in this language. 
Article 6 of the Declaration points to the desire for states to cooperate regarding 
minorities. Most importantly, Article 8 says that the above-mentioned articles and 
provisions must not be understood as permission for any act against the territorial 
integrity or the sovereignty of any state.  
 
Therefore, the aim of the Declaration is to construct a mutual understanding between 
states and minority groups and to find solutions for the problems that they are facing. 
“The text can be regarded as a new international minimum standard for minority 
rights” (Miall, 1994: 16). However, the Declaration does not define what constitutes 
a minority similar to the previously mentioned declarations and documents.  
 
1.1.3.2 Minorities Under the Council of Europe  
In the post-War system, the Council of Europe (COE) is another pioneer organization 
which addresses the protection of minorities. The COE, of which Turkey is among 
the founding members, created the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
in 1954. This convention has similarities with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). Both documents are individualistic in their nature and both put the 
stress on preventing discrimination rather than protecting minority rights. Minority 
rights or group rights are protected on the basis of individual rights in the ECHR. 
The core is the individual and the prevention of discrimination in the Convention. 
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Therefore, in this Convention there is prevention of discrimination, but not protection 
of minorities, as in the UDHR. The aim of the Convention is to “secure all persons 
within their jurisdictions strong guarantees of respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms” (Haller, Krüger and Petzold, 2000: 171). 
 
Prohibition of discrimination is regulated in Article 14 of the Convention. The 
Article states that, “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. Therefore, the 
Convention lists several rights of human beings and protects these rights and 
freedoms, and at the same time prohibits discrimination on the usage of these rights 
and freedoms. Everybody should benefit from these rights and freedoms and any 
discrimination or inequality regarding the implementation of these rights is 
conceived of as a violation of human rights.  
 
As mentioned above, the developments in the 1990s have had a great impact on the 
minority issue. “European developments since 1989 have shown that the protection 
of national minorities has become a matter of extreme urgency” (Miall, 1994: 91). As 
we observe in the UN documents in the 1990s, the COE documents also emphasize 
specific positive protections for minorities in this decade. Regarding this trend, one 
of the significant documents of the COE is the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages. It is an important document for people who speak minority 
languages. The languages that are protected in this Charter are the languages which 
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exist in a specific nation and are spoken by a group of citizens but which are not the  
official language. This charter aims to ensure the use of regional minority languages 
in education and the media, and to permit their use in judicial and administrative 
settings, economic and social life and cultural activities. 
 
In the Charter, it is stated that the contracting parties should recognize and support 
the usage of regional or minority languages and should respect the regions in which 
there are regional languages. The Charter states the right to determine which 
language is going to be considered as a minority language. In this respect the aim of 
the Charter is cultural. The Charter is designed to protect and promote regional or 
minority languages as a threatened aspect of Europe's cultural heritage. For this 
reason it not only contains a non-discrimination clause concerning the use of these 
languages but also provides for measures offering active support for them. “Only in 
this way can such languages be compensated, where necessary, for unfavorable 
conditions in the past and preserved and developed as a living facet of Europe's 
cultural identity” 13. 
 
Apart from this Charter, the most comprehensive document of the Council of Europe 
about the minority issue is the Framework Convention on the Protection of National 
Minorities. It is the first multilateral document in the field of the protection of 
minority rights. The first article of the Convention states that, “The protection of 
national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those 
minorities form an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and 
                                                          
13 Article 10 of  the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. 
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thus, this issue falls within the scope of international co-operation”. That is to say, 
this document puts the concept of protection of national minorities clearly under the 
heading of human rights. The subject of minority rights had become a legitimate 
international subject.  
 
This convention mainly deals with the, prevention of discrimination against national 
minorities14; support for the full equality between the national minorities and the 
majority15; development of the conditions necessary in order to protect the 
languages, religions, traditions, cultures and identities of national minorities16; 
guarantees for the freedom of religion, belief, expression and peaceful assembly of 
the people belonging to national minorities; guarantees for the right to reach the 
organs of media and to benefit from these organs17; permission for the usage of the 
                                                          
14 Article 4, paragraph 1: The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national 
minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any 
discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 
 
15 Article 4, paragraph 2: The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order 
to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective equality 
between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. In this respect, 
they shall take due account of the specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities. 
 
16 Article 5, paragraph 1: The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons 
belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential 
elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. 
 
17 Article 9 paragraph 3: The Parties shall not hinder the creation and the use of printed media by 
persons belonging to national minorities. In the legal framework of sound radio and television 
broadcasting, they shall ensure, as far as possible,, that persons belonging to national minorities are 
granted the possibility of creating and using their own media. 
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mother language in public as well as private18; and the opportunity to learn the 
minority language and to have education in this language19.  
 
Besides these documents, there are also some important institutions of the Council of 
Europe which protect the human rights and also minority rights. These important 
institutions are the Human Rights Commission and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR). States have the right to consult to the ECHR on human rights issues 
and also individuals have the right to petition this court20.  
 
1.1.3.3. Minority Under the Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) 
Though they lack a specific definition like the UN and COE documents, basic OSCE 
documents demand that states contribute to protection of the different features of 
people living in the same nation. In the Helsinki Final Act, there is an article 
regarding national minorities stating the necessity of respecting the right of the 
national minorities to be equal before the law and calls for states to permit these 
people to benefit from basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition, the 
article 3 (2) of the Copenhagen Document ratified in June 1990 states that, “the right 
to fully protect and development of their cultures without facing with any 
                                                          
18 Article 10, paragraph 1:The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority language, in private 
and in public, orally and in writing. 
 
19 Article 13, paragraph 1: Within the framework of their education systems, the Parties shall 
recognise that persons belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage their 
own private educational and training establishments. 
 
20Turkey recognized the right of individual petition in 1987 and the authority of the court to 
compulsory jurisdiction in 1989. 
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movements of assimilation, despite the will of freely expressing, protecting and 
developing their own ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identities”; the right to 
use their mother language both in public and private (3.2.1); the protection of their 
own educational, cultural and religious institutions (3.2.2); the right to reach, 
communicate and spread information in their mother language (3.2.5). In addition 
they should be given a possibility to form their own “local or autonomous 
administrations” (3.5). The rights given in the Copenhagen Document were repeated 
in the Paris Charter in November 1990 and at the OSCE summit in Helsinki in July 
1992.   
 
The UN, the COE and the OSCE have been the primary supranational organizations 
dealing with the problem of minority rights after the Second World War. These 
organizations brought the concept of minority rights onto the agenda of international 
relations. These organizations brought a different dimension than the League system 
to the protection of minorities. These organizations aim at solving problems not with 
bilateral treaties for specific situations, but with universal conventions or charters. 
The minority issue gained a universal character after the Second World War with 
these organizations.  
 
1.2 Problems of Definition 
“Any examination of international minority protection is 
immediately confronted with the problem of conceptual clarity 
stemming from the lack of a universally agreed upon definition 
of the term minority” (J.Preece,1998:14). 
 
 “The lack of clarity regarding the concept of minorities is common among all 
international organizations” (Fottrell and Bowring, 1999: 232). Thus, it would not be 
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wrong to say that there is not an internationally accepted definition of the term 
minority. Many definitions have been proposed by scholars, officials appointed by 
international bodies, and in documents issued by international institutions.  
 
The UN’s special reporter F. Capotorti in the Covenant on the Civil and Political 
Rights in 1966 makes the most important definition. According to Capotorti; 
“a minority is a group which is numerically inferior to the rest 
of the population of a State and in a non-dominant position, 
whose members posses ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the 
population and who, if only implicitly, maintain a sense of 
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
religion or language”21. 
 
Secondly, a Canadian reporter, Jules Deschénes, made another definition in 1985, 
which has some similarities with the definition of Capotorti. According to his 
definition minority is; 
“a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical 
minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, 
endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
which differ from those of the majority of the population, 
having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if 
only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim 
is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law”22. 
 
The examples of such definitions can easily be broadened. However, no generally 
accepted definition of minorities has been formulated in any international 
instruments or doctrine to date (Council of Europe Press:45). It is very interesting not 
to have a clear-cut definition of minority, since it has been a vital issue over many 
                                                          
21 Un Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 Add.1 
 
 
22 UN Doc. E/cn.4/Sub.2/1985/31,para.181.s 
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years in international relations. What should be stressed is the overall picture and the 
collective outcome that we encounter with examining the different definitions of 
minority. All of the definitions are based on several basic principles. The first is 
being different from the majority population. The minority must be different from the 
rest of the population in several ways, such as religiously, linguistically, racially or 
culturally. The second one is being numerically inferior. So, compared to the total 
population, these groups are less in number. This principle implies that the number of 
the minority group cannot be close to the majority of the population. The third one is 
not being dominant in the society. The numerical majority does not always mean that 
they are dominant. For example, in South Africa, the whites, constituting 20% of the 
population, were dominant over the black population, which forms 80% of the 
population. The fourth principle is that these minorities must be citizens of a given 
State, but having less rights and freedoms compared to the dominant population. This 
means that they should be loyal to the State. The people who are not loyal to the state 
are not considered as a minority. The final principle is that there must be solidarity 
and they must have the notion of being a minority. There must be a demand to 
protect their characteristics and traditions.  
 
1.3 Individual Versus Collective Rights Debate 
The difficulty faced in defining “minority” arises from the anxiety especially of 
unitary states about the fragmentation of minority groups and the disadvantages that 
could result when these fragmented groups are classified. One outcome could be the 
evolution of territorial demands from these groups if such a clear definition is made. 
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In addition, multinational states fear the consequences of secessionist trends. 
According to Williams23,  
“the nationalist tries to establish the minority’s right through the 
creation of separate nation. Despairing of achieving true 
recognition for his/her culture in the majority community he/she 
concludes that the only proper solution is for the minority to 
have its own state”.  
 
 
Recognizing the minority as a group may also lead to self-determination and may 
lead to the demands of separation. In addition “even in good faith, a government, 
particularly of a multicultural State (and few states do not contain some multicultural 
element today), may fear that, when full or partial autonomy is granted to one group, 
others will raise claims of their own” (Fotrell and Bowring, 1999: 31-32).  
 
All minorities are groups, but when it comes to recognition, the stress must be put on 
the individual. In this way, minority rights are accepted as individual rights but not as 
collective rights. For example, Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights states that:  
“In those states in which ethnic, linguistic or religious 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall 
not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practice their own religion or to use their own language”.  
 
 
“It must at once be noted that the right extends to persons belonging to such 
minorities and not the minority as a group” (Fotrell and Bowring, 1999: 4). When a 
reference to minorities is needed, the term “rights of the persons belonging to 
national minorities" is used” not “rights of minorities”. This means states avoid 
                                                          
23 See in Watson, Michael. 1990. Contemporary Minority Nationalism.p: 171. 
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making a clear and accepted definition of minority and they also avoid clearly 
defining the rights of these minorities. As a matter of fact, in almost all international 
documents minority rights are recognized in an individualistic way, and the concept 
of a collective rights is not accepted by the majority of states in the international 
arena, because it is widely accepted that there is no right above the individual. 
Similarly, as Thornberry (1991: 173) states, “minorities are not subjects of the law, 
whereas persons belonging to minorities could be defined in legal terms”. 
 
1.3.1 Individual Rights Having Collective Dimension  
When we examine the given rights of minorities in specific major documents of 
supranational organizations, mainly during the 1990’s, we recognize that some rights 
are granted to some groups of people. This brings the issue of the confrontation 
between individual and collective rights. Collective rights, as can be understood from 
its name, is considered to be the collectivity of the rights of some amount of people. 
Most of the supporters of collective rights consider these rights as the rights of the 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. These rights are generally conceived as the 
rights of the people who share the same cultural characteristics, in addition, they are 
seen as necessary in order for this group to protect their cultural characteristics. In 
this respect, “the objective of collective rights is to protect the different identities and 
physical maintenance of the groups, which have a specific identity and existence” 
(Çavuşoğlu, 1999: 56). Although in the above mentioned documents, the rights are 
granted to “the persons belonging to national minorities”, there are some references 
that these can also be used collectively. For instance, the Framework Convention on 
the Protection of National Minorities enables individuals to use the rights stated in 
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the Convention collectively24. Furthermore, in the Copenhagen Document, there is 
also reference to the collective usage of given rights 25. These references to the usage 
of the rights of “persons belonging to national minorities” means the rights of these 
persons can be considered as collective rights, although they are given to the 
individual and they belong to individuals.  
 
On the other hand, some writers still believe that in international relations the 
emphasis is on the “individual”. In none of the documents of major supranational 
organizations is there a reference to “minority rights” as a group. The real aim is the 
prevention of discrimination, not the protection of minorities. “States could not 
afford to bear the cost of providing special facilities for minority groups, and finally, 
positive action in favor of minority groups constitutes discrimination against the 
remainder of the population” (Fottrell and Bowring, 1999: 93).  
 
Therefore, it is a fact that international documents emphasize the individual 
dimension of minority rights. Each document stresses that the rights of “persons 
belonging to national minorities”. These people have the right to protect their own 
culture, language and religion. They also have the right to not to be exposed to 
cultural assimilation and furthermore, the states are obliged to eliminate any possible 
assimilation attempts. These kinds of references create the protection of group 
                                                          
24 Article 3, paragraph 2 : Persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy 
the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually 
as well as in community with others. 
 
25 Article 32, paragraph 6: Persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights 
individually as well as in community with other members of their group. 
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identity. In this respect, people have the right to choose whether to include 
themselves in a minority or not, and they also have the right of protection of the 
identity of the person and the group against state authority. On the other hand, the 
stress on individualism in international documents is a precaution to eliminate people 
belonging to a specific group having self-government or self-determination. In this 
framework, minority rights are considered as “individual rights having collective 
dimension” rather than collective rights (Çavuşoğlu, 1999: 64). In other words, “the 
rights may, therefore, be described as benefiting individuals but requiring collective 
exercise” (Thornberry, 1991: 173). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
EVOLUTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS AND SHIFT IN THE 
LIBERAL PERCEPTION ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND 
LIBERTIES 
 
 
2.1 The Evolution Process of National Minorities  
 
“Liberal democracy emerged as a reaction to the way that feudalism defined 
individuals’ political rights and economic opportunities by their group membership” 
(Kymlicka, 1995a: 34). That is to say, Liberalism introduced new ideas such as 
individualism and individual rights and freedoms against group rights and 
membership. In the “period between the Reformation and the French Revolution a 
new social class established its title to a full share in the control of the state” (Laski, 
1936: 11). These people were those who had mobile capital. The emergence of this 
kind of a new class in society led to the creation of new conditions in society and 
consequently led to new social relationships (1936). It is not unexpected that, these 
newly emerged conditions and relationships created a new philosophy, namely 
Liberalism. Actually, it would not be wrong to say that discoveries, innovations and 
as well as new forms of living also contributed to the formation and the development 
of this philosophy.26 
 
                                                          
26 One of the most important discoveries is printing, as Harold Laski mentions in his book The Rise of 
European Liberalism, which enabled the spread of literacy and also the new ideas and philosophies. 
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When we talk about Liberalism, we generally talk about freedom and the absence of 
any kind of privilege exercised by men over others. Other main aspects of this 
philosophy are the limits imposed on political authority and the foundation of a 
system in which the state does not have the right to intervene. As society developed 
and as the centuries passed, the terminology of Liberal thought starts to change and 
new concepts like tolerance, universal suffrage, freedom of expression, freedom of 
thought, freedom of association, self-government and self-determination came to the 
fare. Therefore, the development in this regard created a ground for the development 
of minority rights under the heading of human rights. 
 
According to Kymlicka, the intention of the early liberal philosophers was to explore 
the relationship between the individual and the state (1995b). It is a fact that the later 
developments on the minority issue were affected by these philosophies and 
thoughts. Individualism and individual rights, in the meanwhile, developed into 
human rights. Development of society and the transformation of it on the basis of 
nation-states, prepared the grounds for the transformation at the level of minority 
issue. For example,  
“the French revolutionaries, though also concerned with the 
nation, proclaimed the rights of man and of the citizen. The 
tradition is carried on in contemporary international 
declarations and covenants on human rights, for –with certain 
exceptions- the rights enumerated are the rights of individuals 
in relation to the state” (Kymlicka, 1995b: 31). 
 
In addition, these philosophies regarding individual rights vis-a-vis the state over a 
period of time turned into minority rights. This transformation started in 19th century 
Europe. The legal recognition of national minorities as national groups rather than 
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religious communities coincides with the 1815 Vienna Congress. At later stages, 
developments such as nation-state building brought impetus to the discussions about 
minority issues, and in early 1900’s we encounter new trends towards ethnic and 
national minorities. This trend at the same time coincides with the shift in the Liberal 
thought and ideology.  
 
 
2.1.1Religious Minorities in the 17th and Early 18th Century 
Although the concept of national minorities and the rights of minorities came into 
existence in the 19th century, the background of this evolution dates further back. 
Therefore, in order to understand the evolution of minorities and minority rights, one 
should start from examining issues in the 17th century.  
“Far from being a post-Cold War development, international 
relations that have to do with the position of European 
minorities possess an identifiable history not only in the 
twentieth century but from the 1640s onwards”(Preece, 1998: 
55). 
 
According to Preece, the Congress of Westphalia can be considered as the dividing 
line between the medieval and modern periods (1998). It can be considered as the 
beginning of the modern age, since it can be seen as the starting point of international 
system, which is composed of separate parts (states) and moves in accordance with 
specific rules born with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. That is to say, this peace 
process resulted in both the beginning of the modern age and also in the emergence 
of a modern society. In addition, the later development of sovereign territorial states 
is the natural outcome of this process.  
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“All modern societies are marked by diversity and difference- differences of 
ethnicity, culture, and religion in addition to the many individual differences, which 
characterize the members of such societies” (Horton, 1993: 1). This is because 
diversity and heterogeneity of the society are the genuine and indispensable 
components of modernization. As societies modernize, they become more complex 
and diversities in the society become inevitable. In modernized societies, there is a 
need for the creation of a community and this results by emergence of new types of 
belongings (John Rex, 1996). These types of belongings can occur in the way of 
ethnicity, language or religion. If this is the situation, it is inevitable to have tensions 
and some conflicts in that society among these differentiated groups. In this kind of 
differentiation, specific demands of groups become inevitable. These demands result 
in the creation of minority rights in order to reduce the tension in the society.  
 
However, during the 17th century, there was not a concept of minority as we 
understand it today. By saying the Peace of Westphalia can be considered as the 
beginning of the modern age and modern society, we do not mean that there was a 
recognition of ethnically, linguistically or culturally different people. On the 
contrary, the differentiation was based on religion during these times. The Peace of 
Westphalia was made in order to cease the on going Thirty Years War. At the end of 
the War, people identified themselves by their religion but nothing else. In other 
words, there was not an understanding of minority rights, but religion “was the focus 
of minority rights during this period because religious affiliation was the most 
important dividing line between communities in Europe at this time” (Preece, 1998: 
56). People used their religious similarity or difference in their social relations. They 
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identified themselves with religious identities such as Catholic, Protestant, Lutheran, 
or Calvinist rather than being an Englishman, a German or a French (1998).  
 
Starting from this period, in the treaties and peace agreements, we generally 
encounter some protections regarding religious beliefs. Some guarantees were 
granted to religious communities in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and also in the 
Treaty of Paris in 1763 regarding free exercise of religion27. These rights or 
protections were between the kings and the people belonged to a different religion 
then other parts of society. These protections can be interpreted as a special 
relationship between the king and the religious group, and this relationship resembles 
the relation between the states and its national minorities. The king had to protect the 
religious minorities in order to guarantee their maintenance and survival as the 
nation-states had to protect the minorities in order to keep them alive.  
 
Thus, we can argue that the root of minority rights goes to the 17th century and early 
18th century. The above mentioned treaties and peace documents had a great 
importance in such a way that religious minorities in Europe were recognized as 
minorities, though they cannot be considered as national minorities that we have 
today. 
  
 
                                                          
27 Article 4 of the Treaty of Paris: His Britannick Majesty, on his side, agrees to grant the liberty of the 
Catholic religion to the inhabitants of Canada: he will, in consequence, give the most precise and most 
effectual orders, that his new Roman Catholic subjects may profess the worship of their religion 
according to the rites of the Romish church, as far as the laws of Great Britain permit. 
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2.1.2 Individual Freedom and Equality in the American Declaration of 
Independence and Popularization of Lockean Ideas 
 
Another event having significant consequences regarding the evolution of minority 
rights is the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. This was a document 
which declared the independence of the 13 colonies from England and also declared 
the establishment of the United States. The basis of the Declaration is that people are 
born free and live free28; the state exists in order to protect the freedoms of the 
individual and to provide equality of these freedoms, since it is instituted by men29; 
any state that violates the freedoms of individuals loses its state of purpose, and 
therefore it is the basic right of the people to get rid of the current government and 
constitute a new one30.  
 
In this framework, we recognize that the above-mentioned criteria of the American 
Declaration of Independence shows similarities with the ideas and philosophies of 
John Locke, who is one of the founding fathers of Liberal thought. One of the basic 
arguments of his writings is that; 
“Men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and 
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one Sovereign 
Master, set into the world by his order and about his business, 
they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to 
                                                          
28 It is stated in the first pharagraph of the Declaration that; We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, 
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
 
29 The continuation of the sentence above from the Declaration; “That to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”. 
 
30 Same sentence continues as; “That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these 
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their safety and happiness”. 
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last during his, not one another’s pleasure” 
(Ashcraft,1987:101). 
 
That is to say, people are all the creations of God and they are all equal. And, “the 
premise of natural equality is identical to the premise of natural freedom”   (Grant, 
1987: 200). According to Locke, all people are the “creatures of the same species and 
rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the 
same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination and 
subjection” (Locke, originally published in 1690: 9). Moreover, according to Locke, 
the agreement among these equals creates the government. In other words, the 
government must be based on consent among free and equal individuals. Since the 
people are the creations of God, they are all equal. God has the supreme authority 
and consequently, one cannot use one’s power or authority over the other, because 
we are all equals. There cannot be any subordination among men. 
 
Since, men have natural rights and freedoms, political authority has the duty to 
preserve these premises. Any government, which ignores the preservation of these 
rights and freedoms31, is considered as illegitimate and tyrannical, according to 
Locke. Moreover, according to him, the agreement among these equals creates the 
government. In other words, the government must be based on consent among free 
and equal individuals.  
 
What one understands from Locke’s writings is that, he looks at freedom from the 
individualistic point of view and tries to explain freedom and equality from an 
                                                          
31 These premises are freedom and equality, which are the natural rights of human beings. 
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individualistic understanding. On the other hand, he accepts that there are obligations 
of the people as well as rights. The government is the creation of the people by 
consent and the rules of the government must be obeyed. “In any form of legitimate 
government it must be understood that political power is a trust from the community 
as a whole and that all members of the community, including those in authority, are 
subject to its laws” (Grant, 1987: 200). In addition, the revolution against the 
government is not described as a step towards realizing an ideal of justice, but as a 
resistance to political deterioration (1987).  
 
2.1.3 Towards National Minorities, the late 1700’s and 1800’s 
The first milestone regarding the minority issue is the French Revolution of 1789. 
This Revolution had a significant effect in the emergence of the concepts of cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic groups. J. Preece mentions in his book that there were no 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic groups within the European states before the French 
Revolution (1998)32. It is the French Revolution which proliferated the notions of 
nationalism, nation and also the individual. These notions focused on the nation and 
the elements of the nation. Therefore, national minorities that we understand them 
today started to be recognized.  
 
After the Revolution, as is mentioned before, the French National Assembly 
promulgated a document stating the rights of the citizen (The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen). The French declaration listed the “inalienable rights” 
of the individual. The rights to “liberty, property, security, and resistance to 
                                                          
32 J. Preece refers here to B. Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 
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oppression” and the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were also 
guaranteed. Furthermore, the document affirms the equality of men. Thus, the 
Revolution had an immense effect on the evolution of the “human rights”, as well as 
on the proliferation of the ideas of nationalism and the nation-state.  
 
“The American Revolution did much to popularize the Lockean ideas of toleration, 
natural rights and political representation and to link these to the concept of 
legitimate power. The French Revolution went on to make the rights of nations a 
corollary to the rights of man” (Preece, 1998: 58).  
 
When we come to the 19th century, we encounter the second milestone. This is the 
recognition of minorities as national groups. Starting from the Vienna Congress in 
1815, minorities started to be recognized, not in the form of religious minorities, but 
in the form of national minorities. And respectively, the concept of minority rights 
evolved in this era. Before the Congress, what used to be mentioned were religious 
minorities and the preservation of the rights to religious activities and individual 
rights and preservation of these rights. However, in the Final Act of the Congress of 
Vienna33 the formulation of the concept of minority rights has changed with the 
effect of the existence of nation-states(Preece,1998). This means that, the concepts of 
civil and political rights started to occur in addition to religious freedom and rights. 
                                                          
33 It is the Congress in which some discussions were made regarding the problems that occurred in 
Europe after the French Revolution between October 1814 and July 1815. The leader of the Austrian 
Empire, Franz Von Metternich, aimed at a collective action plan among European powers against 
possible nationalist movements and against the possible problems that may occur because of 
nationalist tendencies. 
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Furthermore, these developments brought the idea of equality of people as well as 
equal treatment of them.  
 
The ideas of minority and minority rights gained an increased momentum after the 
Congress of Berlin in 187834. With this congress these ideas spread outside of 
Western Europe(1998). Especially, in the Balkan Peninsula, these ideas spread 
rapidly and this spread resulted in border changes and the formation of new states in 
accordance with the principle of self-determination.  
 
It is to say, nationalism appeared in the late 18th century, gained strength and started 
to be effective in Europe in the early 19th century. This process had an immense 
effect on the concept of minorities. The focus on religion moved to a focus on 
national aspects. In other words, nationalism replaced religion throughout this 
process as the primary means of differentiations. Minorities were defined in the 
Vienna Congress in 1815 and the above-mentioned change was completed at the end 
of the 19th century. After 1878, the concept of national minorities started to be seen 
in the light of the concepts of civil and political liberties and freedoms. This 19th 
century philosophy was also reflected in the 20th century and these developments 
brought some significant developments in the consolidation of the notion of human 
rights and also of minority rights. Therefore, it would not be wrong to claim that 17th 
and 18th century philosophies, which basically focused on individual liberty and 
freedom, and later the French Revolution, which proliferated the ideas of nationalism 
                                                          
 
34 It is the congress participated in by the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Germany, Britain, the Austria-
Hungarian Empire and France. It made some regulations on the territory of the Ottoman Empire with 
regard to the Bulgarian Princedom.  
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and the nation-state, had a great impact on 20th century philosophy and on the 
developments in this century on the issues of human rights and respectively on 
minority rights. 
 
2.2 Shift in the Liberal Understanding 
 
2.2.1 Effect of Nation-State Building (Reconstruction process) 
“During the first half of the nineteenth century there was 
almost universal agreement among the educated middle class 
in Europe that the nation-state was the only viable political 
organization worthy of an age of liberalism and enlightened 
politics”(Mann, 1990: 211). 
 
The 19th century was the century of the nation-state and these years were the years of 
reconstruction of Europe in accordance with the creation of nation-states. This 
reconstruction brought new perceptions about the minority issue and minority rights.  
 
This reconstruction process coincides with the shift, or rethinking of liberal 
perspective. It is generally believed that liberal ideas are opposed to ethnicity and 
nationality and consequently to group rights (Kymlicka, 1995b). On the contrary, 
minority rights have an important part in Liberal understanding. In early liberal 
thinking, or in the philosophies of the founders of Liberalism, individuals were seen 
as the possessors of rights. Individual freedom and individual equality were the 
major points of these philosophers. Contemporary Liberals, in contrast, deal also 
with ethnic or national diversity. This is because, with the strengthening of the 
nation-states in the 19th century, the ideas of the French Revolution like nationalism 
and differentiations in nations became heated issues in Europe.  
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“A nation-state is commonly defined as a polity of homogeneous people who share 
the same culture and the same language and who are governed by some of their own 
members, who serve their interests” (Tivey, 1981: 13). These features of the nation-
state were attacked in the 19th century. These were the years of the nation-state, but 
also these years were the years of the emergence of cultural distinctive groups in 
nations. According to Orrdige35, “from the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
culturally distinctive groups within larger states responded to these aspects of the 
nation-states…and they demanded some degree of self-government”. Additionally, 
as Macartney36 believes, these desires of the culturally distinctive groups for freedom 
enjoyed considerable sympathy among Liberal opinion in Western Europe. “For 
example, it was a common tenet of nineteenth-century liberalism that national 
minorities were treated unjustly by the multinational empires of 
Europe…”(Kymlicka, 1995a: 50). This shows the importance given by the Liberal 
philosophers of the time to national minorities. Therefore, we can say that Liberal 
thought has not only focused solely on the individual, but also the rights of groups in 
a given nation, namely group or communal rights. 
 
This new trend or shift in Liberal philosophy is the result of the ideas of the French 
Revolution and the nation-state building and new concepts resulting from these 
developments. It is the French revolution, which “especially challenged the 
traditional foundations of authority that underpinned the European ‘Old Order’ and 
                                                          
35 A. W. Orridge, “Varieties of Nationalism”, in Tivey, Leonard ed. “The Nation-State The Formation 
of Modern Politics”, p. 45.  
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ensured that states would increasingly need to invest themselves with the aura of 
popular consent” (Jenkins and Sofos, 1996: 13).  In addition, nation-state building 
necessitated giving the different people living in the nation their rights and freedoms.  
 
As was mentioned before, different people have different identities in the nation-state 
(Rex,1996). “There is no people in the world that shares such homogeneity, where 
there are no regional on cultural differences, where all speak the same language or 
share the same linguistic usages…” (Tivey, 1981: 13). New identities bring new 
demands from these people. Therefore, the satisfaction of these demands and needs 
becomes the core issue.  
“…human needs exist at various levels (for example, at the 
level of the individual  and at the level of the community), and 
that the existence of needs implies a right to meet them…that 
the good can be sought for units at various levels, and that 
there is a right to promote the good. This principle justifies 
individual rights, and it also justifies the rights of 
communities, including the communities that constitute the 
state”(Kymlicka, 1995b: 37). 
 
2.2.2 New Demands and Movable Identities 
These communities start to occur in Western Europe and also their democratic needs 
and demands. Their demands were generally about language rights and political 
representation. These demands needed to be accepted, because the society was not 
homogeneous any more, and it was acceptable to have different demands coming 
from different parts of the society having different identities. In this respect, minority 
rights started to take shape with these demands and the need to satisfy them.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
36 C. A. Macartney, “National States and National Minorities”, in Woolf, Stuard ed. “Nationalism in 
Europe 1815 to Present”, p. 103.  
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That is to say, people did not have fixed identities any more (Kymlicka, 1997). 
Modernization and nation-state building foster an ideal type of autonomous 
individual and that individual is free to prefer choice and mobility over identities. 
The identities are not fixed any more, since modernization and nation-state building 
encourage individuals to choose their own identities without reservation. This side of 
modernization fosters ethnic and cultural groups (1997). It is clean that each nation 
has undergone a nation building process and this requires some unification around 
several values. Some identities may have no difficulty in assuming these values; on 
the other hand, some may have. If these people are forced to be assimilated into the 
dominant culture, the identities of these people will be stronger and would create 
more problems. Because individuals hold strongly their autonomy, they also give 
importance to their culture and identities. This is because they have freedom of 
choice. They can choose what is good for them and the state should be neutral 
towards these choices. In this respect, Liberalism is also included in this change and 
it also changes with it. It changes its shape with the effects of these developments. 
Liberal thought cannot be indifferent to these demands and needs of people. 
Therefore, Liberal thought and Liberal states accept that people have different 
identities and they have their societal cultures. Moreover, Liberal thought supports 
the social, educational, religious and ethnic activities of individuals both in the forms 
of public and private expression (1997).  
 
This stress on identity and communal rights can clearly be seen in the 20th century. 
Especially in the second part of the 20th century, the concept of minority rights 
gained considerable importance. After the Second World War, several supranational 
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organizations and their multinational documents stressed human rights and minority 
rights respectively. But more importantly, “…with the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of communism the protection of minority rights has risen to the top of the 
political agenda of the first time since 1945”(Miall, 1994: 7).  
 
2.2.3 Rise of Societal Cultures 
The emergence of the minority concept as we understand it today, coincides with the 
emergence of nation-states. The American and the French Revolutions had a 
significant impact on the creation of nation-states. In addition, the impact of early 
Liberal understanding on these revolutions should not be underestimated. The ideas 
of Liberalism and the ideas of early Liberal philosophers such as freedom and 
equality of individuals had a great impact on the American and French Revolutions. 
The result of these revolutions, mainly the French Revolution was the proliferation of 
the ideas of nationalism and the nation-state throughout the world. The construction 
of nation-states brought a new type of society to nations. These were the modern 
nations and these were the nations of differentiated identities. Identity was not based 
on religion any more. New ethnic or linguistic identities occurred in these newly 
established nation-states. The 19th century was the century of the nation-state and 
also the century of the development of these new identities. Therefore, the concept of 
minority rights, on the grounds of national minorities, occurred basically in this 
century. As new demands evolved coming from different segments of the society, the 
need to satisfy these demands became the core issue. The satisfaction of these 
demands emerged in the form of protection of minority rights.  
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As these developments happened, what also occurred was the transformation of 
Liberal understanding. These developments affected the whole world as well as 
Liberal thought. As individual freedom was the fundamental principle of 
Reformation Liberalism, Enlightenment Liberalism accepted the new identities and 
new groups in society and also accepted group identities (Gilbert, 2000). In other 
words, Liberal thought accepted that there are societal cultures in liberal states. But, 
there can be more than one societal culture in a nation. This is because, in the nation 
building process, some groups may be integrated into the dominant culture and 
others may not or some groups may not want to be integrated (Kymlicka, 1997). 
They have the right not to be integrated because people have freedom of choice. In 
this framework, while Liberalism supported individual freedom and individual rights 
in the early days, it later shifted and also started to support some collective rights of 
some groups in society having distinct societal cultures. In other words;  
“liberal commitment to individual freedom can be extended to 
generate a deep liberal commitment to the ongoing viability 
and flourishing of societal cultures…this leads to the rise of 
minority nationalisms, i.e., to the demand for language rights, 
and self-government powers. These rights and powers ensure 
that national minorities are able to sustain and develop their 
societal cultures into the indefinite future” (Kymlicka, 1997: 
35).  
 
2.3 The Problem of Self-Determination 
 
2.3.1 Definition of Self-Determination 
“The idea of self-determination was championed by European Liberals from the 
French Revolution onwards” (Miall, 1994: 8), and it started to be conceived as a 
“right” starting from the Revolution (Kymlicka, 1995a). Similarly, Clark and 
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Williamson (1996) believe that self-determination is generally conceived as universal 
human right. Although, there is no mention of self-determination in the European 
Convention of Human Rights, the concept is considered as a “right”. In the UN 
Charter and in the later Resolutions and Covenants of the UN, there are references 
that “people have the right to self-determination”37.  
 
 In the 1960’s, there were tremendous developments regarding self-determination. In 
1960, the UN General Assembly published the Resolution 1514 (XV) and the UN 
also promulgated the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. These Resolutions and the Declaration, in simple language, 
proclaim the right of self-determination of “all peoples”. This Declaration states that; 
“All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural 
development”. 
 
This paragraph is also repeated in the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 
and also repeated in the first articles of the two Human Rights Covenants; the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. In this respect, there is no doubt that self-determination is considered 
as a right in international relations and it is a right of “all people”.  
 
According to above-mentioned definition, basically, all peoples have the right to 
determine their future. In other words, self-determination is a right of all people in 
determining their future and their social, economic and cultural activities. On the 
                                                          
37 It is stated in Article 1.2 in the UN Charter Chapter One titled as Purposes and Principles that; “to 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”.  
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other hand, this kind of a claim is directed against the political and territorial 
integrity of an existing state if it involves the people living under a specific state 
(Tomuschat,1993). In this respect, it is normal for states to be very concerned about 
considering a given ethnic, religious, or linguistic group as “people”(1993).  
 
2.3.2 Problematic Concept: “Self-Determination” 
With the recognition of new societal cultures and new identities in nations, it is 
inevitable to have new demands from these people. As new demands from the 
society and the groups in the nations evolved, new rights also evolved in order to 
satisfy these demands. This was handled with the consolidation of human rights after 
the Second World War, as mentioned before. On the other hand, all this new 
recognition of societal cultures and the new demand coming from these cultures are 
the sources of differentiation and complexity. In this complexity, there are also some 
complex issues regarding human rights, such as self-determination. 
 
It is obvious that, self-determination is considered as a right, but the problem is 
defining who is able to or entitled to use this right. It is a general perception in 
international relations that “every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under 
which they shall live” (Kymlicka,1995b:43)38. On the other hand, it is not mentioned 
who these people are. Does the term “all people” refer to all kinds of people living in 
a state having different language, ethnicity or religion? Or shall we use the term “all 
people” as the composition of a group of people having the capability of forming a 
state? 
                                                          
38 V.Van Dyke refers here to Woodrow Wilson, American Journal of International Law, Vol.70 
(January 1976) 
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There are two understandings of self-determination; external self-determination and 
internal self-determination. “External self-determination defined as the right to 
freedom from a former colonial power and internal self-determination, defined as 
independence of the whole state’s population from foreign influence”(Hannum, 
1990: 49). In this respect, external self-determination is related with foreign 
domination and it is the right of a people to be free from foreign domination. That is 
to say, the right of self-determination is only applicable to people who are under the 
domination of a colonial state. The people living under the colonial power have the 
right to form their own state and determine their own future. Therefore, non-colonial 
people do not have the right of self-determination under international law. 
“According to many writers, only colonial peoples, who have never been able to 
create a state of their own, can have the right to self-determination” (Tomuschat, 
1993: 16). In addition, specific groups cannot have this right and they are denied that 
right regardless of their differentiation from the rest of the population  (1993).  
 
On the other hand, internal self-determination “may imply a collective human right 
enjoyed by the population of a state against the sovereign State”                        
(Tomuschat, 1993: 227). Internal self-determination involves a right of people to 
choose their legislators and political leaders free from any influence (Cassese,1995). 
That is to say, internal self-determination is related to the people living in a given 
state and according to which, people can freely determine their status without outside 
interference.  
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As one can see, one problem with self-determination is defining it. Some writers 
believe that only the people who are under the domination of colonial powers have 
the right to self-determination. These writers do not favor internal self-determination, 
since “it implies the break-up of existing states, and a process which is widely 
perceived as threatening to international peace and stability”(Clark, Robertson, 1996: 
3). Moreover, some others favor internal self-determination, claiming that some 
groups in the State have the right to determine their future, since they have different 
features compared to the rest of the population.  
 
This differentiation of interpretation of self-determination occurs because of a lack of 
definition of the “self”. “…drafters of the UN human rights instruments never 
attempted to define the ‘peoples’ who are the bearers of the right to self-
determination”(Clark, Robertson, 1996: 6). This lack of definition creates problems 
today and leads to different interpretations of self-determination. The right of self-
determination is clearly established in international law; on the other hand, those who 
are entitled to use this right is not clear and determined yet. It is unanswered whether 
the “self” of the “people” is a group in the society or the state. If it is the state, then 
there is no need to discuss the concept, because if the “self” includes states under 
colonies, most of them have become independent and for that reason, the time for 
self-determination has passed (1996).  
 
2.3.3 Contemporary Application of the Principle of Self-Determination 
Although self-determination “emerges from the UN and exists for peoples under 
colonial and alien domination, that is to say, who are not living under the legal form 
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of a state”(1996), it is certain that it is not any more related to people living under 
colonial powers (Tomuschat,1993). The concept has more ingredients than this 
perception.  
 
In this respect, one cannot underestimate that in all the UN human rights instrument 
about self-determination, there is always a reference to territorial integrity and 
inviolability of frontiers. The international community always supported and 
followed the principle of national unity (Hannum,1990). This means the non-
recognition of the right to secede. In addition, all UN instruments regarding the issue 
“condemn any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity 
and the territorial integrity of a country” (Hannum, 1990: 48)39.  
 
Therefore, external self-determination is not valid any more. What is applicable is 
internal self-determination. In this regard, what is accepted in international relations 
is that,  
“the right to have a representative and democratic 
government; the rights of racial or religious groups living in 
states which grossly discriminate against them; the rights of 
ethnic groups, linguistic minorities, indigenous populations 
and national peoples living in Federal  
States”(Cassese,1995:102). 
 
This statement involves international human rights. Internal self-determination is in 
favor of human rights (Tomuschat,1993). Regarding this, it is accepted that States 
have some responsibilities. There needs to be a government representing the whole 
                                                          
39 For example, the UN General Assemble Resolution 2625 (XXV) after stating the rights of all 
peoples to self-determination, states that; nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as  
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States… 
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people and this government should not discriminate on the bases of race, creed, sex 
and religion. There is a need to participate freely in the decision making process. 
These are the parts of internal self-determination. If these conditions are not satisfied, 
those people who are exposed to such discrimination have the right of self-
determination (1993). If there are constitutional safeguards, there is no need to talk 
about the right of self-determination.  
 
In this framework, it is generally accepted that not all differentiated groups in a state 
can claim self-determination. There should be discrimination and the rights of a 
group should be violated in order to talk about any claim regarding self-
determination. In addition,  
“self-determination need not mean full sovereignty, and hence 
to recognize a right of self-determination does not itself 
commit us to affirming that every group to which the principle 
of self determination applies has a right to secede” (Kymlicka, 
1995b: 352).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE TURKISH PERCEPTION OF MINORITY 
 
 
3.1 Minorities Under Turkish Juridical System  
Minorities under the Turkish juridical system can be legally examined by having 
reference to the Treaty of Lausanne, which is the basic treaty in the construction of 
the Turkish Republic, and the current Turkish Constitution.  
 
3.1.1 Minorities Under the Treaty of Lausanne 
In the Turkish juridical system, there is no reference to minority rights as a rule. The 
concept of minority, whether internal or external, is not first in importance in Turkey. 
The rights of religious minorities that are guaranteed in the Treaty of Lausanne 
constitute the only exception. Therefore, in this perspective, in order to understand 
the legal status of minorities in Turkey “one should look at the Treaty of Lausanne, 
signed on July 24 1924, which is a basic law of the Turkish Republic” (Türkiye’de 
İnsan Hakları, 2000: 258). It was signed by Turkey, the Allied Forces and other 
related nations at the end of the Turkish War of Independence. It is considered as the 
basic law of the Turkish Republic because, 
“the Treaty of Lausanne was not only a treaty arranged the end of a 
war, but it also radically changed  the principles and applications that 
had constituted the core of the international relations with other 
nations. With respect to areas that it regulates, it is not only functional 
in international relations and territorial aspects, but also it manifests 
its impact on the issues regarding the judiciary, administration, 
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economy and other issues regulating daily lives of the people” 
(Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, 1973: V). 
 
In this respect, Sander (1994) also agrees that it is a mistake to consider the Treaty as 
only a single treaty regulating the end results of a war40. According to him, Turkey’s 
membership in several international European organizations owes much to this 
Treaty. In sum,  
“Lausanne is not only a long lived treaty signed after a national 
independence war. Lausanne is a treaty that changed a 1000 years of 
world history, …for the first time enabled a nation-state in the Middle 
East to enter the European system and which seized the spirit of the 
Renaissance” (Sander, 1994: 14). 
 
In this basic law of the Turkish Republic, “the Kemalist state was affected by the 
Ottoman legacy with respect to internal and external minorities”, and it regards only 
non-Muslims as a minority, and again similar to the Ottoman Empire, “does not 
consider the Muslim citizens as minorities, although they have some differences in 
several respects” (Oran, 2000: 122). Under these conditions, the only minorities in 
Turkey are the religious minorities: namely the Armenians, Jews and Orthodox 
Greeks whose status are regulated under articles of 37-45 of the Treaty of Lausanne. 
These articles of the Treaty guarantee the freedom of religion and conscience and 
also regard these people, those who are non-Muslim Turkish citizens, as equal before 
the law. This is the reason why “the spokesmen of the Turkish state claim that there 
is no minority problem and declare that everything about the minority issue was 
solved with the Treaty of Lausanne” (Türkiye’de İnsan Hakları, 2000: 259).  
 
                                                          
40 This idea of Oral Sander and the following citation was taken from the speach of him in the 
international seminar  entitled The Treaty of Lausanne in Its 70th Anniversary (70. Yılında Lozan 
Barış Antlaşması). All speaches in this seminar were edited by the Inönü Foundation and published as 
a book in 1994 with the same name.  
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 When the Treaty is examined, it can be seen that the basic theme in the part 
regarding the minority issue is non-discrimination. Zürcher mentions that (1994: 
170), “ as far as the minorities were concerned, a clause was inserted, in which 
Turkey bound itself to protect its citizens, regardless of creed, nationality or 
language…”.41 Turkish citizens belonging to non-Muslim minorities will benefit 
from the same civil and legal rights that the Muslim population benefits from. 
According to the Treaty, “the whole people of Turkey will be equal before the law 
without any religious discrimination”42. The agreement also grants some specific 
rights and freedoms, like freedom of education in their mother tongue to the non-
Muslim population that is regarded as minorities. This right is guaranteed in Article 
41 of the Treaty of Lausanne. Education in minority schools can be held in their 
mother tongue as well as Turkish. The students belonging to minorities can take their 
education both in their own schools or in Turkish schools; it is left to their own 
choice.  
 
Therefore, it is clear that the minority issue in Turkey was first legally regulated by 
the Treaty of Lausanne. The constant usage of the term “Turkish citizens belonging 
to non-Muslim minorities” in the Treaty shows the generally accepted perception 
towards the minority issue. It is obvious that the importance is given to the concept 
of “equality before the law”; non-Muslims benefited from the same political and civil 
rights as the majority Muslims, namely the stress is on citizenship. This stresses the 
                                                          
41 Article 38 of the Treaty states that, “Turkish government reaffirms that it will provide a great 
protection for the lives and freedoms of all its citizens without any discrimination of religion, race, 
birth, nation and language”. 
 
42 Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne 
 
  
 
 
54 
non-discriminative nature of the Republic. Since the Treaty of Lausanne is the 
fundamental document regarding minorities in Turkey, it reflects the attitude of the 
state toward minorities, which attaches importance to citizenship together with non-
discrimination.  
 
3.1.2 The Constitution and the Minorities  
Other than the agreements and the treaties, some articles of the Turkish Constitution 
also refer to the non-discriminative nature of the Turkish Republic. Article 10 of the 
Constitution states that: 
“All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the 
law, irrespective of language, race, color, sex, political opinion, 
philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such 
considerations. No privilege shall be granted to any individual, 
family, group or class”.  
 
In addition, according to the Article 24, “everyone has the right to freedom of 
conscience, religious belief and conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and 
ceremonies shall be conducted freely…”. In the framework of these articles of the 
constitution, all citizens benefit from the same rules and laws and have the same 
obligations without any discrimination or privilege regardless of any difference.  
 
On the basis of above-mentioned information, “the Republic of Turkey is a 
democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the 
concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; 
loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in 
the Preamble” (Article 2). What underlies a democratic country is the notion that 
everybody who is bound to the state by citizenship is considered equal irrespective of 
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religion, language and ethnicity, which was the ultimate aim of Atatürk and his 
friends in the process of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. And it is obvious 
that there is no space for any notion of minority in this kind of understanding, since, 
in such a state all citizens from all religious or ethnic backgrounds are first class 
citizens43. There is no class of citizenship. Additionally, all citizens are treated 
equally before the law and this is guaranteed by several articles in the Constitution. 
Therefore, constitutional citizenship is one of the main principles upon which the 
Turkish state was founded. And as İçduygu and Soyarık mention, in the issues of 
ethnic, religious and minority rights, “constitutioal citizenship is repeatedly 
pronounced” (1999:188). The Turkish Constitution stipulates that the State and the 
Nation are indivisible, and that all citizens irrespective of their ethnic, racial or 
religious origin, are equal before the law. As Özbudun states (1998), this is the 
principle of “one state, one nation”44, in which a nation, as the citizens of the state, 
unite for the sake of the state and any kind of secessionist trend that may endanger 
the unity of both the nation and the state is forbidden. 
 
In the light of the above, it can be understood that the official policy of the Turkish 
state towards the discussion of minority is as follows: it is the ultimate right of 
people to have and preserve their ethnic identity, but these people are in an equal 
degree obliged to be loyal to the state, which was also the basic priority in the 
Ottoman Empire. If some groups having different ethnic or cultural differences act as 
if they are not citizens of a given state, the state will not be able to free itself from 
                                                          
43 The term “first class citizens” is used by Emre Kongar in one of his articles published in 
Cumhuriyet on July 24, 2000, p: 3 
 
44 which is more a fiction rather than a reality according to İçduygu and Soyarık. 
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chaos and anarchy. It is claimed to be an indisputable reality that all Turkish citizens 
are free to equally exercise their rights guaranteed by the Constitution and by 
relevant laws. There is no discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, race, creed, 
gender, language or religion. Indeed, discrimination on these bases are very much 
alien to Turkish culture and it is prohibited under applicable laws. Therefore, the 
perception is that there is no need to stress ethnic or other differences, since the 
equality of all citizens is constitutionally guaranteed.  
 
3.1.3 Constitutional Citizenship  
 
This kind of an understanding has its implications in the theory of citizenship. In the 
theory of citizenship, as Stolcke (1997: 61)45 states, “there are analytically three 
distinct dimensions to membership in a nation-state”. These three dimensions or 
components of citizenship are citizenship as a legal status, citizenship as an identity 
and citizenship as a civic virtue. In the legal status part, the acquisition of citizenship 
rights became conditioned by specific legal rules and there are “legally ordered 
qualifications which make the individuals members of a nation state” (Stolcke, 1997: 
62)46. However, according to Kymlicka and Norman “citizenship is not just a certain 
status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also an identity, an 
expression of one’s membership in a political community” (1994: 369). In addition, 
they also state that it requires an emphasis given to the virtues. Therefore, it would 
not be wrong to claim that, the concept of citizenship is a combination of all these 
three dimensions or components.  
 
                                                          
45 See in Bader, V.1997. Citizenship and Exclusion.  
 
46 See in Bader, V.1997. Citizenship and Exclusion. 
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It is obvious that the Turkish state’s perception is to conceive citizenship as a legal 
status, showing similarities with the French system or perception. As Üstel claims 
(1999), citizenship in France focuses more on the constitutional values, not on 
historical, cultural or political ones. Therefore, it is claimed that the French people 
are equal according to the Constitution without any discrimination and regardless of 
any difference based on culture, ethnicity or language. In this respect it is a fact that 
this kind of a system is egalitarian in the way that it considers individual rights and 
freedoms of the citizens.  
 
The Turkish view of citizenship is similar to this notion, that is, it has a constitutional 
value. In this notion, in which citizenship has a legal-status, citizenship is essentially 
a matter ensuring that everyone has specific citizenship rights and is treated as a full 
and equal member of the society. According to Marshall (1992), the membership to 
the nation is ensured by a number of citizenship rights. He divides citizenship rights 
into three categories: civil rights, political rights and social rights. As mentioned 
before, this kind of an understanding attaches importance to the non-discriminatory 
nature of the system, as it is experienced in the Turkish system, which pays immense 
importance to the legal status of citizenship and in which all citizens are given the 
same formal and legal rights regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, religion or class.  
 
The above-mentioned understanding is called “legal citizenship” by Üstel (1999: 
147) and it is basically rooted in the understanding of citizenship as a legal status, 
which is not very different than the concept of “constitutional citizenship” in the 
Turkish understanding, as she claims. She mentions that Süleyman Demirel first 
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brought the notion of constitutional citizenship to Turkey in 1992 and he defines it as 
follows;  
“Constitutional citizenship is a notion combining all the citizens 
of the nation in terms of rights and duties on the grounds of 
equality. All the citizens of the nation, owing to the principle of 
constitutional citizenship, experience the right to be volunteers 
to all duties and able to undertake these duties regardless of 
differences on religion, language, ethnicity and gender.  
…the constitutional citizenship is the enjoyment of these rights 
and duties on the ground of equality and being ensured about not 
being deprived of the right to be employed in the state 
apparatus, the right to elect and to be elected because of specific 
reasons” (Üstel, 1999: 151).  
 
This notion of constitutional citizenship has its traces in the understanding of 
“constitutional patriotism”, which was first formulated by Habermas in 199247. He 
gives the examples of Switzerland and United States as multicultural societies and 
according to him these states; 
“demonstrate that a political culture in the seedbed of which 
constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based 
on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and 
cultural origins. Rather, the political culture must serve as the 
common denominator for a constitutional patriotism which 
simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the multiplicity and 
integrity of the different forms of life which coexists in a 
multicultural society”. (Turner and Hamilton, 1994: 347).  
 
 
In addition as İçduygu and Keyman state, “the reference point in constitutionality is 
not only a common identity, but also is a subject bringing the demands of differences 
into the public realm” (1998-9: 147). Therefore, the role of constitutional citizenship 
is more the acceptance of differentiations.  In this respect, the “constitutional 
patriotism” of Habermas, which was founded on differences, had been changed into 
“constitutional citizenship” in its Turkish understanding. Therefore, the current 
                                                          
 
47 See in Turner and Hamilton, Citizenship Critical Concepts, volume 2, page 347-7.  
  
 
 
59 
understanding of constitutional citizenship is not something different from the 
understanding of citizenship in the beginning of the Republic. Articles of the 
Constitution stating some basic rights and obligations of the citizens and their non-
discriminative nature clearly show the tendency in the Turkish Republic. On the 
other hand, the founders of the Republic have chosen constitutional citizenship, but 
this was a choice in accordance with the necessities, conditions, realities and the 
legacies of the time. This choice of the understanding of citizenship has historical 
reasons and can be explained by the Ottoman heritage, the strong state tradition, and 
the vision of Atatürk combined with the effect of some important secessionist 
movements, which will be dealt further below.  
 
3.2 Historical Facts Leading to the Choice of Constitutional 
Citizenship 
It is obvious that the application of citizenship is a constructed one. In other words, 
citizenship in Turkey is a choice of the decision-makers. In this respect, there should 
be some reasons for this decision and one can give the reasons for this choice by 
referring to the Ottoman heritage, the strong state tradition and the vision and 
thoughts of Atatürk.  
 
3.2.1 The Ottoman Heritage and Minorities 
“In the late 18th century…the Ottoman Empire roughly consisted of: the Balkans, 
Anatolia, and most of the Arab world” (Zürcher, 1994: 11). As Koçoğlu mentions 
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(2001)48, since it ruled a very large territory over a very large period of time, it was 
very normal to have different types of people in the Ottoman society. Having very 
large territories as such gave the Empire a feature of a collectivity of cultural, 
religious and ethnic differences. Although the dominant feature was Islam, Ottoman 
society was composed of different people having different features. In addition, 
“these different people lived together for centuries under the Ottoman rule protecting 
their own cultures” (Bozkurt, 1989: 1).  
 
In this complexity and differentiation, the Ottoman society was based on religious 
differences instead of ethnic, linguistic or cultural ones. Ethnicity has never had an 
application in the Ottoman rule. The society was classified as Muslims and non-
Muslim populations. The subjects of the Ottoman Empire “were classified by being a 
Muslim, Orthodox, Orthodox Greek, Catholic, Protestant or a Jew instead of being a 
Turk, Bulgarian or Arab” (Bozkurt, 1989: 1). There was not a differentiation or 
classification based on nationality, race or ethnicity. The only criterion was religion. 
All the population was considered as subjects of the Empire.  Also in Europe, people 
identified themselves with their religions. As Preece states, “religion was the essence 
of the minority issue, since the religious relations were the most important element in 
the 17th and 18th century Europe” (2001: 70). People did not identify themselves with 
their national identities and nationalities but with their religions. This tradition was 
the same in the Ottoman society.  
  
                                                          
48 Also see in Vakkasoğlu, Vehbi, Osmanlı İnsanı, p: 11; Soykan, Tankut, Osmanlı İmpsratorluğunda 
Gayrımüslimler, p: 2; Bozkurt, Gülnihal, Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının Hukuki Durumu, p: 
1. 
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Despite the differences in the Ottoman society, people lived in harmony. Vakkasoğlu 
(1999) believes that, although the basic difference was religion, none of the features 
of the people were considered as important and all the people living under the rule of 
the Ottoman Empire were considered as Ottoman subjects. And according to Azmi 
Süslü, all these subjects, regardless of their religious, ethnic or cultural differences, 
lived in peace, welfare and harmony for hundreds of years49.  
 
The reason for this harmony and peace in the Ottoman society was Ottoman 
toleration. The Ottoman Empire has always been tolerant of different features of 
different people. “Ottoman Turks, like other Turkish states in history have always 
been tolerant to the religious beliefs of others throughout history. In no part of the 
Ottoman history, did religion become a problem in the Ottoman society” 
(Parmaksızoğlu, 1982: 56). Similarly, İnalcık (1982) also agrees that tolerance 
marked the Ottoman policy towards its non-Muslim population, and the Ottoman 
Empire was a paradise for these people. All religious societies in the Empire were set 
free to hold their religious beliefs. Ottoman rulers never forced the people living in 
the territories that they occupied to change their religions. There was never a politics 
of assimilation by the Ottoman rulers towards the people living in the occupied 
territories. For example, as Parmaksızoğlu states (1982), after the conquest of 
Constantinople, Fatih Sultan Mehmed called the people that were hiding and 
declared that they could travel peacefully and freely and called the people back who 
left their houses because of the occupation and let them live in accordance with their 
own traditions and cultures. This shows us that the Ottoman rulers did not engage in 
Islamization politics. “There is not any Islamization evidence in history by the 
                                                          
49 See in III. Osmanlı Sempozyumu, p: 62.  
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Ottoman rulers since it is not permitted in Islam” (Akyüz, 1999: 99).  In addition to 
this, according to Cyrus Hamlin, if the  Ottoman Empire had forced the people that it 
ruled to be Muslims, today probably there would not be Armenian, Cyprus or Eastern 
questions50. The rulers set people free in their daily lives and set them free in their 
religious lives and beliefs. In addition, even in Shariat, no one, even a slave, can be 
forced to be a Muslim. Ottomans only encouraged people to be Muslims, but force 
was never used force in order to convert someone from his or her religion to Islam. 
That is to say, non-Muslim subjects could protect their existences and those 
characteristics which set them apart by the help of Islam.  
 
According to Vakkasoğlu (1999), in the same period, when the Ottoman Empire 
showed the best example of tolerance in its society, Europeans could not even 
imagine that different people having different beliefs could live together. Regarding 
the European perception, İnalcık (1982: 2) gives the example of Jews stating that, 
“the Ottoman Empire was a paradise for the Jews, who were cruelly oppressed in 
Western Europe”. Because of this, the West experienced hundreds of years of 
religious wars between the different sects of the same religion in Europe. While 
Europe was experiencing these bloody religious wars, we see that the Ottoman 
Empire “gave non-Muslims their right and freedom of religion and conscience and 
we also see that these rights were put into practice” (Akyüz, 1999: 229).  
 
This unique toleration of the Ottoman Empire made the Ottoman territories a heaven 
for those with different religious, ethnic and cultural differences. All these different 
people lived peacefully under the Ottoman rule. The Empire opened its territories to 
                                                          
50 Vakkasoğlu, Vehbi, Osmanlı İnsanı, p: 227. 
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all people who suffered under other empires and similarly these people wanted to be 
ruled by the Ottoman Empire. For instance; 
“When Catholic Spain expelled her citizens of the Jewish faith 
and gave her Muslim inhabitants the choice of conversion or 
death, it was the Ottoman Empire, which opened its doors to 
tens of thousands of persecuted refugees51…In the following 
centuries, the Ottoman doors were thrown open to a wide variety 
of groups including Russian Old Believers, who refused to 
conform to the orthodoxy imposed by Peter the Great, and 
Polish refugees fleeing their homeland following the 1848 
Revolution. In short, throughout its history, the Ottoman empire 
remained a heaven for religious and political refugees” (İzgi, 
2001: 1)52.   
 
“Since the Ottoman State put into practice the feature of tolerance starting from its 
establishment, lots of people wanted to be ruled by it and accepted the dominance of 
the Empire” (Vakkasoğlu, 1999: 71). Vakkasoğlu adds that Protestant Christians, 
those who were oppressed under the dominance of the Catholic Papacy and 
Habsburg Empire, chose Ottoman rule and saw the Ottoman Empire as a survivor. 
Additionally, a Jewish migration to the Ottoman territories occurred after 1492. 
According to Yetkin (1992), the settlement of the Jewish communities was not a 
coincidence but a conscious event. The reason for this migration basically was to 
secure life and the freedom of religion and conscience in the Ottoman territories. 
İnalcık’s explanation regarding this is that “ Jewish emigrants from Germany were 
overjoyed at the favored position of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire. They were free 
to live and trade as they pleased. …their enterprise found rich sources of profit” 
(1982: 2). In other words, Ottoman territories were the places of peace and presence.  
 
                                                          
51 Also see in Vakkasoğlu, Vehbi, Osmanlı İnsanı, p: 78 and Koçoğlu, Yahya, Azınlık Gençleri 
Anlatıyor, p: 36.  
 
52 See in Ataöv, Türkkaya, Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period, p: 1. 
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It is obvious that these freedoms were not only applicable to the Jewish community 
but also to all other religious communities living under Ottoman rule. Apart form 
these freedoms; these communities were also included in the state apparatus. These 
people were in harmony within the power cadres. That’s why the Empire was able to 
rule a very large territory for hundreds of years. In this kind of a society, in which 
people fuse regardless of differences, subjects realize that they all belong to the same 
existence. That is one of the reasons for the longevity of the Empire. These realities 
show that, the Ottoman Empire supplied a better life than the Christian states did 
during the same period of time.  
 
The non-Muslim population in the Empire starting from the conquest of 
Constantinople to 1839 Hatt-I Sherif of Gülhane (Gülhane Hatt-u Hümayunu) was 
subject to the same regime. In the Muslim- non-Muslim division, the non-Muslim 
population was referred to as “millets” and the system as the “millet system”.  
“This system gives the non-Muslim population the right to use their 
own institutions and laws in regulating their behaviors under the 
supervision of their religious leaders…people generally have a 
contact with the ruling class through this millet leader and the millet 
leader was responsible to the sultan with respect to the behaviors, 
tax and other obligations of the millet” (Shaw: 1982: 214).  
 
That is to say, in the Ottoman society, different people of different religions 
constituted different millets. The members of the different millets had equal rights 
and obligations with respect to each other and also with respect to the Muslim 
population. These millets were not discriminated against and did not suffer any 
disadvantaged position because of their religious differences. The only obligation of 
these millets, as well as the other Ottoman subjects, was to behave properly and to be 
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loyal to the state. “Loyalty to the Muslim state was the essential condition” (İnalcık, 
1982: 1).  
 
The Empire started to lose its power and strength and started to lose territories 
starting from the 18th century. Besides, “the nationalism movements after the 
American Declaration that ‘everybody is created equally’ and ‘The Rights of Men 
and Citizen’ in France had major effects on the non-Muslim population” (Bozkurt, 
1989: 2). That is to say, in the 18th century, world affairs started to change. New 
nationalist ideas and trends started to occur and proliferated very fast throughout the 
world. It would not be wrong to say that there were few places in the world that were 
not affected by 18th century developments and ideas. In this situation, being a part of 
the European territory, Ottoman Empire was also affected by these nationalism 
movements and, 
“as a result of a privileged position that they gained with 
immunities in the Ottoman law and as a result of benefits coming 
from being a member of a millet, the foreign subjects became a 
‘millet within the millet’ and became able to do what they want to 
do without any interference of the Ottoman authority. The effect of 
this situation was clearly seen in the period of the collapse of the 
Empire” (Shaw, 1982: 230).   
 
Therefore, in the beginning of the 19th century, in order to prevent the demands of 
separation in the non-Muslim groups living on the Ottoman territory because of the 
effect of the French Revolution, and “in order to administer the state and nation, 
adoption of some new laws were deemed necessary” (İnalcık, 1993: 350). In 
addition, “the laws and regulations aiming at institutionalizing the status of 
citizenship in the Turkish Republic had close links with Ottoman modernization” 
(İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık, 1999:193). 
  
 
 
66 
 
Starting from the 1839 Hatt-I Sherif of Gülhane, “there were fundamental changes in 
the juridical status of the non-Muslim population and it was declared that they have 
exactly the same rights with other Ottoman subjects” (Koçoğlu, 2001: 14). Basically, 
according to the 1839 Hatt-İ Sherif of Gülhane: 
“there is nothing more saintly than life, chastity and honor in the 
world…security of the property must be protected…a full 
guarantee of life, chastity, honor and property is granted to the 
whole people of the nation including both Muslims and other 
millets…” (İnalcık, 1993: 350-352). 
 
Therefore, the Hatt-İ Sherif of Gülhane, guaranteed to all Ottoman subjects without 
distinction of race or religion, individual rights and equality before the law. “The 
principle of equality before the law is strictly emphasized and this is not only 
between the state and the subjects, but also it is understood that it is the equality 
before the law among both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects” (İnalcık, 1993: 357).  
 
“The reform provisions regarding equality for non-Muslims were carried out by 
developing the new doctrine of Ottomanism, which provided that all subjects were 
equal before the law” (Shaw, 1997: 127). İnalcık mentions that, (1993: 358) “this 
politics of the state based on the equality of the subjects of the Empire is the most 
important part of the Tanzimat reforms”. This is Ottoman unification based on legal 
equality. Therefore, one can argue that the current understanding of citizenship in the 
Turkish Republic has its traces in this tradition. 
 
“This polity of the Empire found its certain expression in the 1876 
Kanun-I Esasi stating that ‘each and every person  which is a 
subject of the Ottoman State regardless of religion or creed is 
considered as Ottoman’… Later these traditions and principles were 
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totally developed and became a basic progress line of Turkish 
history. In Turkey, one can relate the trends like the constitutional 
regime easily to the Gülhane Hatt-I Serif” (İnalcık, 1993: 358-
359)53.  
 
“Besides these developments, the Ottoman Turkish bureaucracy, which adopted 
political approaches in the west, started to consider the non-Muslim population as 
minorities in accordance with the notion of nation-state” (Soykan, 1999: 251). The 
recognition of these groups as national minorities goes to the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923. Starting from this date, there exists a general juridical 
arrangement regarding these minorities. As Soykan states (1999), these groups took 
the  status of minorities in accordance with western laws and they started to be 
recognized as equal and free citizens regardless of religion, ethnicity and culture.  
 
3.2.2 The Strong State Tradition In Turkey 
As Kadıoğlu mentions (1996: 177), “a study trying to come to grips with the official 
Turkish identity…makes references to the strong state tradition in this country which 
evolved in such a way as to stifle the civil society”54. The state tradition, which is 
also an Ottoman heritage, in the Turkish Republic, is also important to understand 
the Turkish perception towards minority and citizenship issues. As is known, “one of 
the most striking features of the Ottoman Empire was the virtual identity of the state 
authority and military power” (Finkel and Sırman, 1990: 55). In this respect, Turkey 
has experienced a strong state tradition unlike Western nations such as the nations 
                                                          
53 In addition, İnalcık in his other work entitled What is Tanzimat gives specific articles from the 
Kanun-I Esasi. For instanceArticle 8 stating that “belonging to any religion or sect, all people those 
who are subjects of Ottoman State are called Ottoman and Article 17 stating that all Ottomans, 
regardless of religion and sect are equal before the law” (p.258). 
 
 
54 See in Kedourie, Sylvia, Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics.  
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who are the members of the European Union. This tradition can be considered as one 
of the factors affecting the problems about human rights that are being faced today in 
the process of western integration.  
 
“Despite the changed world of 1923, the Republic of Turkey could not disassociate 
itself from the Ottoman heritage…. The essence of the new state can only be 
understood by thorough study of the six centuries of Ottoman history” (Mayall, 
1997: 21-25). “The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong 
and centralized, highly bureaucratic state”(Özbudun, 1999: 7), also a weak civil 
society. In this type of tradition, the state was the core in holding the society 
together. This tradition occurred because; the Ottoman Empire had to rule a very 
heterogeneous society in a very large territory. It was situated at the crossroads of 
civilizations, religions, and trade. The Empire had innumerable identities, religious 
and ethnic. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman rulers tended towards personal 
rule or extremely state-oriented policies. “In the face of internal and external dangers 
and rising social conflict, the trend of Ottoman government …was autocratic” (Shaw, 
2000: 412). Bringing all these people together and creating a unity was a very hard 
task. It is not surprising that a strong administration and central state was needed. 
Therefore, the external environment and external dynamics had an immense effect on 
the creation of the state tradition.  
 
That is to say, Ottoman rulers had to apply a patrimonial authority over the Empire. 
According to Heper (1998: 119), this “ patrimonial authority of the state did not 
allow for the development of a civil society and the emergence of an autonomous 
  
 
 
69 
class…” which could constitute a force against the state power and which could put 
pressure via demands on the state. The lack of civil society resulted in the 
bureaucracy and military playing a significant role in politics.  
 
In this regard, this lack of civil society justifies the top-down reform attempts both in 
the Ottoman Empire and in the newly established Turkish Republic. On the other 
hand, all reformation attempts in the Ottoman period was in the name of 
strengthening the central authority, strengthening the state itself (Heper, 1985). 
Attempts like the Charter of Alliance (Sened-I İttifak), Hatt-İ Sherif of Gülhane 
(1839) and the Reform Decree (Hatt-I Sherif of 1856) were the attempts to 
strengthen the central power. Therefore, “Tanzimat-I Hayriye…contributed to the 
further centralization of administration” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 55). According to 
İnalcık (1973), these attempts at first seem to be made for the protection of subjects 
against any abuse, but the fundamental aim of this policy was to maintain and 
strengthen the power and the authority of the sovereign. In other words, these 
attempts did not aim at creating or strengthening the civil society; on the contrary, 
they were the attempts from the state to increase its central power over the people 
and over the periphery. 
 
Given long centuries of personal and patrimonial authority exercised over the 
citizens, the underdevelopment of the civil society is not unexpected. People were 
uneducated and they had lost their capacity to take initiative (Heper, 1985). In this 
kind of an environment, the role and the power of the state elite grew and political 
initiative was held by these elites. For that reason “Atatürk entrusted his national 
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mission to elites in the military and civil service establishment…” (Mayall, 1997: 3). 
The necessary reforms had to come from the top in the republican period, because of 
lack of education and lack of capacity to initiative of the people. In this tradition, 
state elites considered themselves as the guardians of the state, and they continued to 
have this attitude also in the post-Atatürk period.  
 
To be precise, the Turkish Republic today has this kind of state tradition, which is 
still strong. One of the primary aims of the state elite is to safeguard the indivisible 
integrity of the nation and the sovereignty of the nation (Heper, 1988). So that one of 
the basic duties of the state is to guarantee that: 
None of the rights and freedoms in the Constitution shall be 
exercised with the aim of …destroying fundamental rights and 
freedoms, of placing the government of the state under the 
control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the 
hegemony of one social class over the others, or creating 
discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion, or sect, or 
of establishing by any other means a system of government 
based on these concepts and ideals (Constitution, Article 14).  
 
In this understanding, “there is an emphasis on solidarity around the idea of 
mainland” and emphasis on eliminating any discrimination on the basis of language, 
race, religion and sect. (Heper, 1988: 9). Peters (1959: 182) mentions the similar 
argument that “the new Turkish democracy…is mainly a defense of national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity”. In this regard, any idea circling around different 
language, race, religion or sect is considered to be against the indivisible integrity of 
the nation. Turkish citizens are only required to be the “citizens” of the nation. They 
should be united around the motherland. The focus is on citizenship. Therefore, any 
emphasis other than citizenship is considered as dangerous by the state elite. On the 
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other hand, one can argue that this kind of a tradition neglects different features of 
the people. There may be some people who have different or additional defining 
features such as other languages, religions or cultures. This is very normal for Turkey 
since it is located at the crossroads of civilizations and religions. Therefore, it is 
natural that there are some cultural and linguistic differences. Moreover, the 
recognition of these differences is expected not considering them as threats to the 
integrity of the nation. When the strong state in Turkey, comprised of political and 
military elite, resists fulfilling these demands, problems start to occur in the 
integration process with the West. It is believed that this understanding is at odds 
with the Western tradition and creates conflicts in the process of integration.  
 
Regarding the indivisible integrity of the state and the preservation of sovereignty the 
impact of the military cannot be underestimated. It would not be wrong to say that 
military in Turkey for over 60 or 70 years have always represented progressive and 
democratic power. In addition, in Turkey “the military is conceived as the pioneer 
institution, which gives way for progress. The image of guarantee of the regime and 
the image of being a leader of the society legitimizes its actions for the people”(Şen, 
1996: 170). This is because starting from the Ottoman period, people and the 
bureaucratic elite always relied on the military. During the times of recession inthe 
Ottoman Empire, during the First World War and during the War of National 
Independence, the military forces always played the role of savior of the nation. As 
Mayall claims (1997:27), “the army had gained heroic status as defender of the 
nation”.  
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Although the military has been seen in Turkey as progressive, Turkey has had three 
military interventions, which have not has been healthy for the consolidation of 
democracy. But it is obvious that the military has not intervened in politics in order 
to hold power. It has intervened in order to overcome the negative situations that 
existed both in the Ottoman Empire and in the Turkish Republic (Cornell, 1998). 
Although military interventions are not conceived of as healthy for the consolidation 
of democracy, it is accepted that “the role and understanding of the military in 
Turkey is unique in the world”(Cornell, 1998: 82). It does not have the aim of 
holding power. Whenever necessary, the military did not hesitate to transfer power to 
civilians, the real holders. Therefore, one can conclude that it is not the intention of 
military to rule the society and to hold the political power. The military only 
intervenes in order to re-establish social order and security.  
 
In the Republican period, as is mentioned before, the reforms had to be exposed to 
the society and this was also achieved with the help of military. This support of the 
military for the reforms continued after the death of Atatürk. Cornell (1998) believes 
that the military considered itself as the protector of the Atatürk’s heritage and the 
guarantor of Kemalist ideas. This is not a strange vision when we consider Atatürk’s 
declaration, stating that: 
Turkish nation…has always looked to the military…as the 
leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals…when 
speaking of the army I am speaking of the intelligentsia of the 
Turkish nation who are the true owners of this country…The 
Turkish nation considers its army to be the guardian of its ideals 
(Heper, 1985: 53).55 
 
                                                          
55 Also see in Mayall, 1997: 28. 
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Atatürk considered the military as the guardian of the ideals of the Turkish nation, 
which are embodied in Kemalist thoughts. In this respect, the military can justify its 
intervention when there is an interruption of or a threat to any of the national ideals. 
The military considers itself obliged rid the state of any danger against state ideals. 
 
When one combines these issues of the role of the military, a strong state tradition 
and minorities, it can be realized that the military and the strong state tradition, have 
had a negative impact on minority, linguistic, or cultural rights in the integration 
process. The military is very sensitive about issues of linguistic and cultural rights.56 
There is a constant fear of secession and the military considers the demand regarding 
linguistic and cultural rights as discriminative actions aiming at dividing the nation. 
In other words, these claims are considered as threats to the sovereignty and the 
indivisible integrity of the nation. For instance, the phrase in the press declaration of 
the National Security Council on January 2002, the wording which was “separatist 
movements in the issue of education in another language other than the legal 
language” clearly shows that such claims coming from the society are considered as 
demands against the integrity of the nation and also against the indivisible integrity 
of the nation. This sort of a perception also creates obstacles in the process of 
Western integration.  
 
                                                          
56 It was stated in the press declaration of the National Security Council on January 2002 in paragraph 
3 that “in the light of the security and intelligence reports including the last one year period, the 
precautions were scrutinized against the separatist movements in the issue of education on another 
language other than the legal language, which is directed by the terrorist organization and the other 
dangerous actions against the security of the nation based on internal or external forces” (January 30, 
2002, Cumhuriyet).  
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It is generally accepted that the military is the guarantor of the maintenance of the 
nation that is surrounded by “enemy” nations (Cornell, 1998). Therefore, one thing 
should not be underestimated that the relations of Turkey with Southern Cyprus, 
Greece, Armenia, problems related to the Gulf Crisis, the Kurdish issue, problems 
with Syria and others, make the intervention of the military in daily domestic and 
foreign politics natural. All these problems retain the importance of the military in 
Turkey. Secondly, tens of years of PKK terrorism aiming at creating a different 
nation within the territories of the Turkish Republic increased the importance given 
to the military in the nation and this terrorism created sensitivity on the question of 
linguistic and cultural rights.  
“The Kurdish issue, initially viewed by the army as a 
straightforward domestic security matter, became the focus of all 
Turkey’s internal and external concerns. It challenged the roots of 
Turkish identity and security, the role of the state in society, the 
nature of its democracy, the economic health and development of 
Turkey, its relations with the West from a human rights angle and 
the rest of the region from a security perspective” (Mayall, 1997: 
84).  
 
The fear of secession becomes superior to the cultural and linguistic rights both at the 
state level and in the eyes of the military. The loss of 30.000 people in the fight 
against terrorism created a very sensitive state, military, as well as society, regarding 
these issues.    
 
3.2.3 Atatürk’s Vision 
In the light of above-mentioned criteria, it can be argued that both the political and 
the military elite consider themselves as the guardians of the national ideals. These 
ideals are basically the ideals of Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. In 
order to understand the emergence of the vision of Atatürk towards the issue of 
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citizenship, one should focus on some basic events during the period and the Young 
Turk57 understanding.  
 
 “Sustainable territories were lost, both at national revolutions and foreign 
occupations” in the beginning of the 20th century (Shaw, 2000: 411). There were 
rising violent nationalist movements in the territories of the Sultan. It is obvious that 
these created tensions and stress within the Empire. “In the first week of October 
1908, Bulgaria declared her independence, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Crete proclaimed her union with Greece” (Lewis, 1974: 55). In addition, “the 
Armenian Dashnaks launched a new wave of terrorism in eastern Anatolia and 
intensified their European propaganda campaign accusing the Ottomans of massacre, 
and the Greek terrorists in Macedonia were equally active” (Shaw, 1977: 287). As 
Shaw states, there were also other problematic issues like the Albanian revolt. These 
events and the Young Turk movement were experienced at the same time and it is 
inevitable that these secessionist movements shaped the views of the Young Turks. 
Ottomanism, aiming at cooperation in a united empire, was developed in the Young 
Turk period, and again, according to Shaw, the Albanian revolt was very effective 
with respect to national interests and it is with this revolt that the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP)58 turned strongly towards Turkish nationalism (1977). So, 
with the emergence of the Albanian revolt, there is a change towards Turkish 
                                                          
57 Coalition of various reform groups (including Jews) that led a revolutionary movement against the 
authoritarian regime of Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, which culminated in the establishment of a  
constitutional government. 
 
58 It was the influential Young Turk organization which advocated a program of orderly reform under 
a strong central government and the exclusion of all foreign influence. 
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nationalism. However, the understanding did not change, which is the unification 
under the state as citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious differences.  
 
In this respect, the “Young Turk formula advocated the idea of constitutionality and 
the equality of all Turkish or Ottoman citizens regardless of religion, language or 
race (Peters, 1959: 181). Since “Atatürk grew up within the climate of those Young 
Turkish Revolutionaries”, their understanding and perceptions affected his 
perceptions and ideas about the future of the country (Peters, 1959: 181). As Shaw 
claims, the circumstances of Atatürks’s life, his experiences and education 
determined his attitudes and direction, which is the “achievement of the rebirth of the 
Turkish nation out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire” (1977: 373). The new 
Turkish Republic, parallel with the Young Turk ideology, finds its basis on equality 
of the citizens, defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
 
The Turkish National War for Independence was fought and in turn, it led to the rise 
of the Turkish Republic, which was the ultimate aim.  
“The Turkish War for Independence came to a successful 
conclusion, and the Turks finally were able to join the other 
peoples of the Ottoman Empire in creating their own 
independent state following the First World War…and Turkey 
was made a secular state, and all citizens, regardless of religion, 
were accepted Turks with equal rights” (Shaw, 2000: 423-425). 
 
After the foundation of the Republic, Atatürk went far beyond the Young Turk 
understanding and put in place more radical reforms in order to create a nation based 
on the union of language, culture and ideals. Hence, Atatürk’s notion of citizenship is 
constructive. It is based on the notion of a nation and living together in the same 
territory without focusing on differences but on the accomplishments of the past. 
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According to him, “each and every individual of the Turkish nation resembles 
themselves, apart from some differences. Some differences coming from birth should 
be conceived as natural” (Tezcan, 1994: 14)59. Today’s understanding of citizenship 
in the Turkish Republic finds its traces in this tendency. In this regard, one can 
realize that the understanding of constitutional citizenship resembles the above-
mentioned understanding of nation and citizenship.  
 
In the light of the above-mentioned criteria one can basically claim that 
constitutional citizenship is one of the basic principles in the Turkish understanding 
of citizenship. This claim comes from the emphasis on the non-discriminatory nature 
of the system. However, one important thing is underestimated that this 
understanding of constitutional citizenship is far from its original Western 
understanding. The Turkish perception neglects differences, and on that point, 
problems regarding minority rights in Turkey create problems in European 
integration. It is obvious that this monolithic understanding of citizenship has 
historical reasons. However, current necessities should not be underestimated. It is 
obvious that Turkish and European perceptions of the minority issue are different 
from each other and the major component of this differentiation is the differentiation 
in perceptions of citizenship. The Turkish perception of citizenship does not fit the 
European one and this stands as the major question in the solution of the minority 
issue in the integration process. Therefore, as regards European integration, it could 
be argued that Turkey should reshape its understanding of citizenship keeping in 
mind that “multicultural politics are not a threat to the existence of a unitary system, 
                                                          
59 Nuran Tezcan collected the handwritings of Atatürk and published them as a book, Atatürk’ün 
Yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri (Citizenship Information Written by Atatürk).  
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on the contrary, it is an element that helps the reproduction of social richness” 
(İçduygu, 1995: 125).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
TURKEY AND THE EU:TWO DANCERS STEPPING ON 
EACH OTHER’S TOES? 
 
 
 
4.1 Citizenship in the European Union 
 
In the previous chapter, the Turkish perception of citizenship was discussed and it 
was stated that the understanding of Turkey and the European Union conflict with 
each other. The former has a monolithic and the latter has a multicultural and plural 
understanding of citizenship. In order to have a better insight of this difference, one 
should also focus on the perception of the European Union. The Union’s perception 
towards the issue is also important since, in order to be a member of the Union, the 
candidate states “must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set 
out in the EU treaties” (Hanlı, 2001: 29). In this respect, not only in the concept of 
citizenship, but also in other areas, the objectives and values given by the Union 
should be accorded great importance because any possible or existing contradictions 
must be focused on and eliminated in order to be a full member of the Union. 
Therefore, in terms of citizenship, in order to better understand the gap between 
Turkey and the Union, it is worth mentioning the notion of European Citizenship, 
which shows the general tendency in the Union in terms of citizenship, although “it 
is an ambivalent development” (Delanty, 1997: 298), and although it is problematic 
in some respects.  
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4.1.1 Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Shengen and the Issue of European 
Citizenship 
European Citizenship takes its basis from the Treaty of Maastricht. As Lemke states 
(1998: 212), “with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, European 
integration reached a new level”. The signing of the Treaty clearly shows the 
beginning of a new era for the Union both in political and economic terms. As 
Article A of the Treaty mentions: 
“By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among 
themselves a European Union…This Treaty marks a new stage 
in the process of creating an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen. The Union shall be founded on the 
European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms 
of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to 
organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, 
relations between the Member States and between their 
peoples”.  
 
 
As it is clearly stated, the aim is to create a closer union with its members and its 
people. This togetherness is created by cooperation and solidarity between the 
member states and their peoples. What one can imply from the treaty is that the 
ultimate aim is to create a union with the member states and their people. Moreover, 
these people are going to be citizens of this Union, in other words, European citizens. 
When Article B of the Treaty is examined, it is realized that this Article openly 
enumerates the objectives and targets of the Union. According to this Article,  
“the aim of the Union is to promote economic and social 
progress…to create an area without internal frontiers…to 
create a single currency…to have a common foreign and 
security policy and a common defence policy…and to 
strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the 
nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a 
citizenship of the Union”.   
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That is to say, if the Union is considered as a unified state, the European citizens are 
the nationals of this state of the EU, which is the fundamental aim. This treaty, in 
this respect, “establishes a political-legal base of ‘European Citizenship’ ” (Borja, 
2000: 47).  
 
In addition, “the introduction of a European citizenship in the Treaty was one of the 
most remarkable steps in the restructuring of relations between member states and 
the emerging polity of the European Union” (Lemke, 1998: 212). It can be 
considered as a legal base for the construction of European citizenship in such a way 
that, “the Article 8 of the treaty establishes a citizenship of the Union” (La Torre, 
1998: 367). In this respect, each person holding the nationality of a Member States is 
considered a citizen of the Union60.  
 
Furthermore, the Treaty enumerates several rights of “European Citizens”. In this 
regard, Articles 8a to 8e grants certain rights derived from citizenship of the Union. 
Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States (8a.1), every citizen of the Union residing in a 
Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand 
as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under 
the same conditions as nationals of that State (8b.1), every citizen of the Union shall, 
in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a 
national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that 
                                                          
60 Article 8.1 of the Treaty of Maastricht states that; Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. 
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. 
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State (8c), and every citizen of the Union shall have the right to petition the 
European Parliament (8d).   
 
Thus, when this is combined with the citizenship theory in the previous chapter, we 
see that “European Citizenship is a citizenship in the ‘classical’ sense” (La Torre, 
1998: 438). In other words, the Treaty of Maastricht, which constructs European 
citizenship, only deals with the rights of the citizens. Therefore, it is only related 
with the legal side of citizenship. In this respect, the Treaty regards citizenship as a 
legal status, which is one of the existing problems regarding European citizenship.  
 
As set out in the Treaty of Maastricht, any national of a Member State is a citizen of 
the Union. The aim of European citizenship is to strengthen and consolidate 
European identity by greater involvement of the citizens in the Community 
integration process. In other words, as Delgada-Mareire states, “the ultimate goal of 
cultural policy…is the strengthening of the citizens’ feelings of belonging to the 
European Union” (2000: 194).  
 
In this framework, apart from Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam is also crucial. It 
completes the list of civic rights of Union citizens and clarifies the link between 
national citizenship and European citizenship. In other words, it is a revision of the 
Treaty of Maastricht (Lemke, 1998). Most importantly, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
clarifies the link between European and national citizenship. It states explicitly that 
“citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”. 
Two practical conclusions follow from this; one is that it is first necessary to be a 
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national of a Member State in order to enjoy citizenship of the Union and secondly, 
European citizenship will supplement and complement the rights conferred by 
national citizenship. The new Treaty adds provisions to the Maastricht Treaty which 
states explicitly for the first time that the Union is founded on certain principles: 
liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 
Therefore, this development meant the extension of European-ness and revision of 
the “acquis communitaire” with the principles of liberal democracy, multicultural 
policies and human rights protection. These are principles held in common by all the 
Member States and respect for them will now be required of applicants for 
membership as a condition for admission to the Union.  
 
In addition to these developments, “ a further remarkable step was the decision to 
include provisions loosening border controls among member countries, the so-called 
Schengen Agreement, in the Treaty on European Union as an integral part of the 
legal institutional arrangements” (Lemke, 1998: 215)61.  
 
The above mentioned treaties constitute the legal side of the ultimate aim of the 
Union, which is to create a European state with its internal frontiers, single currency, 
common foreign, security and defense policies, and most importantly, with its 
citizenship. And with these discussions, the concept of European citizenship became 
a focal point in the debate about democracy in the European Union.  
 
                                                          
61 The Schengen Agreement, worked out in 1985 in the town of Schengen, Luxembourg, formally 
began the process of developing a coordinated policy on immigration. France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Benelux countries were the first to agree to remove the border controls; 
subsequently, after 1990, the other EU countries joined.  
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4.1.2 Necessity to Move Beyond the National State 
In the original theory of citizenship it is agreed that citizenship is the combination of 
its legal status, identity and the civic virtues. However, with regard to above-
mentioned discussion of European citizenship, one must theorize this mode in such a 
way that it goes beyond the nation state (Delanty, 1997). In this sense, in the original 
understanding, citizenship is considered as an existence within the space of the 
nation-state. On the other hand, in the concept of European citizenship, the citizen is 
out of the space of the nation-state. Therefore, there is a new model of citizenship, 
which is post-national citizenship including European citizenship. In the light of 
these explanations, it can be argued that “the status of European citizen is different 
from citizenship as we know it” (La Torre, 1998: 317). The idea of European 
citizenship is different from the citizenship of the Member States. It is more than that 
and it is beyond the nation-state.  
 
That is to say, the European perception of citizenship is post-national, it is beyond 
the state level. Additionally, as Delanty states (1997: 295), “multi-identification as 
the substantive content of citizenship expresses the core of the idea of post-national 
citizenship”. In this framework, it would not be wrong to claim that the concept of 
European citizenship is multicultural in nature, and in a way challenges the 
traditional model of nationality. It challenges nationality in such a way that it 
undermines the sovereignty of national citizenship, which is grounded on legal 
status, as is seen in the Turkish case. Therefore, it is obvious that the candidate states 
in which this kind of an understanding of citizenship is applicable faces as regards 
integration. In other words, “there is no doubt that European integration has involved 
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a shift way from national citizenship”, and the candidates who are unable to do the 
same thing, will be out of the process of integration (Delanty, 1997: 299).  
 
Similarly, as Elizabeth Meehan mentions (1993: 1), a new kind of citizenship has 
emerged “that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that is multiple in the sense 
that the identities, rights and obligations associated…with citizenship, are expressed 
through an increasingly complex configuration of common Community institutions”. 
Accordingly, “identities, rights and political participation are the key features in the 
process of conceptualizing European citizenship” (Lemke, 1998: 213). In this regard, 
the European understanding of citizenship is multiethnic and multicultural in nature. 
This understanding does not eliminate differences. On the contrary, “every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall also be a citizen of the Union”; 
therefore, the “ individual no longer has to give up his language, religion, cultural 
heritage or the like in order to be accepted as a legal person” in the Union (La Torre, 
1998: 369-370).  
 
If this discussion is combined with the constitutional citizenship of Habermas, which 
was discussed earlier, one can realize some parallel points. The Treaty of Maastricht 
has a constitutional character (La Torre, 1998). Based on this constitutional 
framework, an understanding of citizenship is constructed on a multiethnic and 
multicultural understanding in which the citizens do not have to eliminate their 
different features and identities such as language, religion and cultural heritage. 
When constitutional citizenship is concerned, it is defined as “the realization of 
social and political guarantee of acceptance of different ethnic, religious and belief 
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groups in a nation state and the protection and development of their groups, based on 
a social contract such as concretized in a constitution” (İçduygu and Keyman, 1998-
9: 153-4). Therefore, both understandings have a constitutional character and both 
understandings are based on a pluralism and multiculturalism. In both 
understandings, the concept of citizenship is something above the nation-state 
permitting different identities.  
 
By saying that the European Union has a multicultural understanding of citizenship 
and “recognizing its own multicultural policies”, the problems in creating European 
citizenship cannot be underestimated (Delgado-Moreira, 2000: 195). First of all, as is 
mentioned before, European citizenship takes into account only the rights of the 
citizens. Citizens are seen as the right holders and this focuses on the legal status of 
citizenship. Secondly, “whether the acceptance of plural conceptions of citizenship 
within the Union is a solution to this complex issue is debatable” (Lemke, 1998: 
213). In this respect, German and French understandings of citizenship are 
problematic. “In both the German and French models, multiculturalism appears 
unacceptable: in the German because it contradicts the principle of ethnic 
homogeneity, in France because it contradicts the link between political integration 
and acceptance of French culture” (Holmes, 1999: 69). The German case is 
important because it is one of the key actors in the Union. “The legal regulations in 
Germany are ethnically based” (Lemke, 1998: 214). The “Germaneness” is 
important. In other words, in the understanding of citizenship of Germany, being a 
German is important. In this respect, the German notion of citizenship is inclusive for 
Germans living abroad and exclusive for non-Germans living in the country. As 
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Üstel claims (1999), the citizenship in France focuses more on the constitutional 
values, not on historical, cultural or political ones. Moreover, in relations among the 
state and the citizens, there is no intermediary institution based on either ethnicity or 
territory. These intermediary institutions have no place in the French constitution.  
 
4.1.3 Multicultural Understanding in Nature  
Despite these discussions on the problematic side of European citizenship, the stress 
here is on the actual aim of the Union and the multicultural nature of the western 
understanding of citizenship. Although there are some problems regarding European 
citizenship, it is a reality that the Union has “multifaceted citizenship, in which 
national and nationalist citizenship live together with cultural citizenship (of the 
minorities and of the majority)” (Delgado-Moreira, 2000: 31). Therefore, in the 
attempt to build a common European citizenship, there is this celebration of plurality. 
The issue may be a bit problematic but “there is no doubt that the Maastricht and 
Amsterdam, are unlikely to be the last words on the subject” (Holmes, 1999: 35).  
 
4.2 Expectations of the Union from Turkey 
The European Union made a historical decision in 1993 in the Copenhagen European 
Council that “the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
members of the Union. Accession will take place as soon as a country is able to 
assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political 
conditions”62. Within the framework of this decision, the Union put forward some 
principles and values in accordance with the historical legacies, which were dealt 
                                                          
62 European Comission Strategy Paper 2000 
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with in the previous chapters, and also in accordance with the citizenship discourse. 
These general principles are liberal democracy, multicultural policies and human 
rights. Additionally, “the transformation of these principles such as democracy and 
human rights into criteria necessary to be a member state of the Union became 
possible in the Copenhagen Summit in 1993” (Usul, 2002: 9). According to this, if 
the candidate states obey the Copenhagen Criteria, they will likely be accepted as a 
member state of the Union.  
 
In this perspective, the Union has an accession strategy. The first expectation of the 
Union is compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria. Accession Partnership 
documents are the second step towards the integration. In response to the Accession 
Partnership, candidate countries prepare their national program for the adoption of 
the acquis. Apart from these, the European Commission publishes Regular Reports 
and each Regular Report underlines achievements as well as shortcomings of the 
candidate nations. Regarding these regulations, “on 10-11 December 1999, the 
European Council Helsinki Summit welcomed the positive developments in Turkey 
as noted in the Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey and in turn Turkey 
announced its intention to continue with reforms towards complying with the 
Copenhagen Criteria” (Hanlı, 2001: 28).  
 
4.2.1 The Copenhagen Criteria 
As is mentioned above, the first priority is the Copenhagen Criteria for Turkey, as it 
is for other candidate states. “In June 1993, the European Council in Copenhagen 
concluded that candidate countries must be able to satisfy a number of important 
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economic and political conditions known as the Copenhagen Criteria” (Hanlı, 2001: 
27).  
As stated in the Copenhagen Document, membership requires that the candidate 
country has achieved:  
o stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
o the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;  
o the ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
has created : 
o the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its 
administrative structures, so that European Community legislation 
transposed into national legislations implemented effectively through 
appropriate administrative and judicial structures.  
 
As it can be realized, the Criteria is based on two grounds; economic and political. In 
terms of Turkish integration, the political criteria become much more important than 
the economic ones, since most of the problems occur in that field. Verheugen also 
states “political reforms are nevertheless a sticking point for the Commission and the 
member states” (2001: 62). The political criteria are not just limited by the 
Copenhagen Document but further developments are also important in that field. 
Countries wishing to become members of the EU are expected not just to subscribe 
to the principles of democracy and the rule of law, but actually to put them into 
practice in daily life. Respect for fundamental rights is a prerequisite of membership, 
and is enshrined in the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Protocol allowing citizens to take cases 
to the European Court of Human Rights. Freedom of expression and association and 
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the independence of the media must also be ensured. The integration of minority 
populations into society is a condition of democratic stability. A number of texts 
governing the protection of national minorities have been adopted by the Council of 
Europe, in particular the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities which safeguards the individual rights of persons belonging to minority 
groups.  
 
As it was mentioned above, Turkey has displayed a sensitive attitude towards the 
issue of human rights with respect to its constitution and international agreements. In 
this respect, the most important obstacle for Turkey in the process of integration is 
democracy and minority protection. The claims and criticisms against Turkey about 
human rights are not basically on legal or constitutional grounds but rather on some 
shortcomings of them in practice. On the other hand, it is not the issue of whether 
there are criticisms or whether they are right or wrong, the realization of the 
Copenhagen Criteria is the first and basic expectation of the Union from the 
candidate nations. This document constitutes the seed of integration. Verheugen also 
stresses the importance of the Criteria by saying that “the Copenhagen political 
criteria …have to be met before the accession negotiations properly can start” (2001: 
62). Besides this, the fulfillment of this seed later becomes possible with the 
Accession Partnership document and with the regular reports.  
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4.2.2 The Accession Partnership Document 
The Accession Partnerships are the central pre-accession strategy instrument63. As it 
is stated in the Objectives part of the Annex of the Document for Turkey, “the 
purpose of the Accession Partnership is set out in a single framework the priority 
areas for further work…towards membership of the European Union”. The purpose 
of this is to specify the priority areas and achieve progress in these fields in order to 
reach to the standards of the Union. These areas and the progress on them determine 
the future relations of that given country with the Union.  
 
“The Accession Partnership document for Turkey was declared on November 8, 
2000 by the European Commission... and ratified on March 8, 2001” (Usul, 2002: 
15). This document includes short term and medium term priorities for Turkey to 
realize in order to begin accession negotiations. In this way, as Verheugen declares, 
this document plays the role of a “road map” for Turkey and also it includes “ the 
expectations from Turkey and priorities in the way of full membership”64.  
 
When the Document is closely examined, it can be seen that in the Accession 
Partnership demands, Turkey is obliged to permit TV and radio broadcasts in the 
short term and in the medium term, that contains cultural variation, that it must 
guarantee cultural rights for all its citizens, and that it must abolish all kinds of 
obstacles including in the field of education. Moreover, as Usul mentions, “Kurdish 
becomes first in the above mentioned required implications” (2002: 17).  
 
                                                          
63 The European Commission Strategy paper 2000, II,1.  
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For example, in the Part 4.1 (political Criteria) of the Document, it is stated that: 
• Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of 
expression in line with article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.  
• Strengthen opportunities for legal redress against all violations of human 
rights 
• Remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their 
mother tongue and TV/radio broadcasting 
And the Document adds in the medium term criteria that: 
• Guarantee full enjoyment by all individuals without any discrimination and 
irrespective of their language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, 
philosophical belief or religion of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Further develop conditions for the enjoyment of freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. 
• Review of the Turkish Constitution and other relevant legislation with a view 
to guaranteeing rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens as set forth in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights; ensure the 
implementation of such legal reforms and conformity with practices in EU 
Member States. 
• Ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens 
irrespective of their origin. Any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of 
these rights should be abolished, including in the field of education. 
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It is clear from the document that the political criteria are important and in this 
framework, cultural rights are emphasized. The Union specifies the priority area in 
the Document as political criteria and specifically, importance is attached to human 
rights and cultural rights. The Commission strongly encourages Turkey to bring 
about substantial improvements, not only in the constitutional provisions and the 
laws concerning the protection of human rights, but above all in the human rights 
situation in practice. This requires reform of many existing structures and practices. 
 
The document has some features with respect to political change in Turkey. First of 
all, it underlines a social model. It is obvious that the Document takes a multicultural 
society as a model by addressing the aim of opportunities in broadcasting and 
education of different cultures. As a matter of fact, in the medium term, the demand 
is to strengthen the cultural differences of the people irrespective of the origins of 
people and guarantee the cultural rights and the abolishment of the acquis creating 
obstacles in doing so. Secondly, the Union indicates its sensitivity on the issues of 
freedom based on democratic regulations. And finally, the Union stresses the 
necessity of application on these matters.  
 
From the Turkish perspective, these demands on broadcasting and educational rights 
under the heading of cultural rights are alien to the Turkish perception of the 
minority issue and citizenship. Therefore, the fulfillment of these demands would 
“bring about radical changes in Turkey about the minority concept. These changes, 
to a great extent question the nation-state characteristic of Turkey” (Usul, 2002: 9). 
Oppositions were raised both from the military and state elites after the ratification of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
64 These declarations were taken from ntvmsnbc.com on March 9, 2001.  
  
 
 
94 
the Accession Partnership document. For example Brigadier General Halil Şimşek 
declared in his speech (on January 11, 2001) in the Armed Forces Academy that;  
“our nation in under danger of separation under the name of 
cultural rights, broadcast in the mother tongue and educational 
rights for our Kurdish origin citizens, who are the parts of the 
establishment and the integral components of the state, in the 
Accession Partnership document in the scope of individual rights 
and freedoms”65. 
 
This statement echoes the press declaration of the National Security Council on 
January 2002 stating that the demands on cultural rights, educational rights and 
broadcast rights are separatist movements in nature and “they are the initiatives of 
the PKK”66.  
 
Similarly, Prime Minister Ecevit, in a statement, declared that he conveyed to Mr. 
Veheugen, the member of the European Union Commission responsible for 
enlargement, that “the inclusion of Kurdish into the education program is 
unacceptable. People if they wish can freely talk Kurdish. They also can be seen on 
TV. However, it is impossible to take Kurdish into the program of foreign language 
courses”67. In addition to this, in another declaration of the Prime Minister, he stated, 
“everybody should freely explain and publish their thoughts. If there are 
shortcomings in this field, they will be corrected. However, I do not find it suitable if 
it is transformed into an element of education”68.  
 
                                                          
65 The full version of his speech is available at ntvmsnbc.com/news/56105.asp  
 
66 January30, 2002, Hürriyet.  
 
67 February 6, 2002, Radikal. 
 
68 February 22, 2002, Hürriyet.  
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Other than international documents, some statements by high ranking European 
Union officials also reflect the perceptions and demands of the Union. In this 
respect, the most important official for Turkey is Günher Verheugen,.  He is one of 
the most influential figures in the Turkish integration process since he is responsible 
for the enlargement process. His declarations are as important as the documents 
ratified. In other words, his declarations can be considered as the verbal demands 
coming from the Union.  
 
4.2.3 Demands on Cultural Rights  
Therefore, the demands coming from the Union are not limited to documents. Other 
than the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership document, the 
statements and declarations of Verheugen also state the necessity to satisfy cultural 
rights, educational rights and broadcast rights. He also mentions that “the beginning 
of membership negotiations depends on Turkey’s capability of fulfilling the 
European Union Criteria” and adds that “ the next step for Turkey should be the 
necessary constitutional amendments on the death penalty and education in the 
mother tongue”69. Since these issues are included in the Accession Partnership and 
also are part of the EU Criteria, Turkey needs to take necessary steps in order to 
begin membership negotiations. Furthermore, in his special declaration given to 
NTV representative Murat Akgün mentions that all these “regulations and 
necessities are preset and these are the rules of the game”70. And he adds that some 
                                                          
69 February 15, 2002, Cumhuriyet.  
 
 
70 For full text of the declaration: ntvmsnbc.com/news/136085.asp 
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areas were not touched upon. As to areas of shortcoming, he again gives the example 
of cultural rights, and specifically education and broadcast rights.  
 
These further statements on cultural rights have created unrest both in the state and 
military elite. These statements basically refer to the Kurds, which is a very sensitive 
topic for both the elite and also for the society as a whole. “The Kurdish question is 
certainly one of the most difficult tasks that the Turkish state has to handle, 
particularly since it involves concerns of security against separatism” (Duner and 
Deverell, 2001: 5). Other than this separatism concern, when the concern is the 
minority issue “there is no domestic debate on giving the Kurds special status as 
minority.  The main argument against this is that they are regular Turkish citizens” 
(Duner and Deverell, 2001: 5).  
 
Overall, political criteria are primary in terms of the integration of Turkey into the 
Union. In this perspective, the Copenhagen Criteria, the Accession Partnership 
document and some statements of high ranking officials of the Union set the “rules 
of the game”. The result of this game depends on the ability of Turkey to respond to 
the rules. Nonetheless, “by nature, a significant share of responsibility is taken by 
Turkey; on the other hand we think that it is natural for us to expect a careful 
evaluation of our sensitivities and visions from the European Union” (Loloğlu, 2001: 
181).  
 
4.3 Capacity of Turkey to Assume the Obligations for Membership 
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4.3.1 The National Program 
In line with the demands and expectations of the European Union, “Turkey was 
requested to swiftly submit its National Program for adoption of the community 
acquis based on the Accession Partnership Agreement…” (Hanlı, 2001: 30). It is 
obvious that Turkey has some responsibilities in this integration process and the 
National Program is the most important road map that is going to determine the 
direction of Turkey in this process. In other words, “in fact this document is a 
response to the Accession Partnership, which was prepared by the European Union 
and which underlines the policies of change that Turkey has to implement and the 
spirit of change that it has to adopt”71.  
 
The Program reflects the intention of the state to be a full member of the Union and 
in this direction, Turkey affirms that she is going to take all necessary measures in 
the process of integration. In the introduction part of the Program, it is stated that:  
“The Turkish Government regards EU membership as a new 
step forward, a milestone confirming the founding philosophy 
of, and Atatürk's vision for the Republic. 
Turkey will accede to all relevant international conventions and 
take the necessary measures for their effective implementation 
in order to align further with the universal norms manifest in the 
EU acquis and practices in EU Member States, particularly in 
the areas of democracy and human rights”.  
 
Basically, the Program has two parts; political criteria and economic criteria. 
Although the latter is much longer than the former, the most important part of the 
program is the political criteria, since most of the crucial problems occur in that 
field. In the political criteria, it is stated that: 
 “The Turkish Government will closely monitor progress in the country in the areas 
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, regularly evaluate the work 
                                                          
71 March 20, 2001, Radikal.  
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underway for harmonization with the EU acquis, and will take all necessary 
measures to speed up the ongoing work.  
In addition, legal and administrative measures will be introduced in the short or 
medium term regarding individual rights and freedoms, the freedom of thought and 
expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly, civil society, the 
Judiciary, pre-trial detention and detention conditions in prisons, the fight against 
torture, human rights violations, training of law-enforcement personnel and other 
civil servants on human rights issues, regional disparities”. 
 
Although, the program asserts that “The modern Turkish Republic is founded on the 
principles of peaceful foreign policy, secularism, the rule of law, a pluralistic and 
participatory democratic system, and fundamental human rights and freedoms” and 
“although, there are some important reform initiatives based on democracy, rule of 
law and human rights in the National Program, there is not any single important 
project about cultural rights and minority rights that the Union expects Turkey to 
handle”(Usul, 2002: 20). As is mentioned before, the National Program is a response 
to the Accession Partnership Document and in the Accession Partnership Document, 
cultural rights and multiculturalism were given great importance. Because of this 
reason, the 2001 Progress Report considers the Turkish National Program falling 
short of the Accession Partnership and demands a revised version of the National 
Program. It is stated in the Report that: 
“Turkey’s NPAA is part of an evolving process under the pre-
accession strategy. A revised document to be prepared as soon 
as the Turkish authorities have has the opportunity to complete 
their initial review of the acquis should function more as a 
planning tool for future work…the present NPAA makes it 
insufficiently clear how Turkey will address a number of 
priorities in the Accession Partnership such as those on cultural 
rights. The NPAA falls considerably short of the Accession 
partnership priority of guaranteeing cultural rights for all 
citizens irrespective of origin. Furthermore, the priority on the 
removal of all legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish 
citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting is to be 
included” (Commission of the European Communities, “2001 
Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”, (p: 
103).  
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Therefore, the Union considers the National Program as falling short of expectations 
and in this respect considers Turkey unable to adopt the political criteria72. 
Furthermore, not only the Union, but also some state officials in Turkey are 
uncomfortable with the National Program. For instance, Mesut Yılmaz, one of the 
coalition leaders, admitted that the National Program has some shortcomings in this 
respect, he states that TV and radio broadcasts in the mother tongue should not be 
restricted and cultural rights should be given more importance73. 
 
At first sight, the Program is a comprehensive one. It includes a variety of spheres 
from political criteria to the economic. It suggests a total reform of the juridical 
subjects under discussion. It puts forth a series of fundamental reforms. However, 
when one carefully examines the document, one realizes that the state does not offer 
concrete solutions for the existing problems or demands. At the end, there are 
serious contradictions between a logic that limits the political and social pluralism 
and considers it is as a threat, and the stand of the European Union, which adopts 
pluralism and multiculturalism as a basic philosophy of the European model. And 
this contradiction clearly damages the persuasiveness of the Turkish National 
Program.  
 
4.3.2 Constitutional Amendments 
                                                          
72 November 14, 2001, Hürriyet.  
 
73 March 25, 2001, Cumhuriyet. 
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Turkey, in order to show its seriousness and intention towards accession to the 
Union adopted a major constitutional amendment. This amendment of 33 articles 
“was ratified by the Grand National Assembly (GNAT) on October 3, 2001 and this 
amendment is the most comprehensive amendment that has been done” (Eroğul, 
2002: 273). These amendments are related to the Copenhagen political criteria and 
the Accession Partnership. That is to say, with these amendments the necessary 
constitutional changes were made that are to be done on the road of accession.  
 
“Several of the amendments are intended to prepare the ground to meet some of 
Turkey’s Accession Partnership priorities…” (Commission of the European 
Communities, “2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”, 
p:15). Especially, the articles were reformulated in a way that emphasizes individual 
rights and freedoms, necessities of the society, modern democratic standards, 
universal norms, human rights and the rule of law. As the 2001 Report mentions, 
“the recent constitutional amendments are a significant step towards strengthening 
guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms…” (p: 19).  
 
The major fields of change regarding the political criteria are the abolishment of the 
restrictions on the freedom of thought, the limit on the limitation of the basic rights 
and freedoms and the abolishment of the language prohibition. In this respect, in the 
first amendment in the Preamble of the Constitution, the mentioning of  “no 
protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish National 
interests…” has changed into “no protection shall be afforded to actions contrary 
to…”. The reason for this change is to abolish the restriction on freedom of thought 
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and to make it a rule that not the thought but the action can be restricted. The second 
important  amendments is in the field of basic rights and freedoms. In this regard 
there is an enlargement of these rights and freedoms with the new amendment. In 
this amendment, it is stated that the limitation on the basic rights and freedoms 
cannot be against the letter and the spirit of the constitution, the necessities of a 
secular republic and democratic social order and also cannot be against the principle 
of moderation. “In other words, the limitation can only be made if it is related to an 
article in the constitution and if any limitation is necessary in accordance with an 
article in the constitution” (Eroğul, 2002: 274). . In addition, these limitations can 
only be made by laws. The third major change is on the restriction on the use of 
language.  
As regards cultural rights, progress can be reported with the 
amendment of Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution, in which 
the provisions forbidding the use of languages prohibited by law 
have now been abolished. This could pave the way for the use 
of languages other than Turkish and is therefore a positive 
development” (Commission of the European Communities, 
“2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession”, p:28).  
 
Although this is a major development, in accordance with the Accession Partnership, 
it is not enough. Actually, with this regulation, the ban on language is not totally 
abolished in that Article 42 of the Constitution is not abolished; it states; “no 
language other than Turkish shall be taught as mother tongue to Turkish citizens at 
any institutions of training or education…”. In this respect, as is stated in the 2001 
Report, “the actual situation has not improved, notably in relation to broadcasting 
and education…no amendment under the constitutional reform provides for 
education in languages other than Turkish” (p: 28).  
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The amendments are not limited to these fields. There are other areas of change like 
the reduction of the period of pre-trial detention, the freedom of association, the 
limit on capital punishment, the limit on the closure of political parties, the 
protection of private life and the increase in the civilian members in the National 
Security Council.  
 
These reforms have been positively welcomed by the Union. In major documents 
like the 2001 Regular Report and by statements of high ranking officials of the union 
like Verheugen, it is understood that the reforms are considered as positive steps for 
the accession, but they are insufficient. The constitutional amendment is a major step 
but steps in the field of political criteria are positive but not enough. These 
developments should be reflected in implementation of them74.  
“the constitutional amendments adopted by the Turkish 
Parliament on 3 October 2001 are a significant step towards 
strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and limiting capital punishment. The 
amendments narrow the grounds for limiting such fundamental 
freedoms as the freedom of expression and dissemination of 
thought, freedom of press and freedom of association. Attention 
was now turned to the effective implementation of these 
important changes” (Commission of the European 
Communities, “2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession”, p:96).  
 
Additionally, Verheugen mentions;  
“we are definitely satisfied and are happy about the reforms that 
Turkey has introduced. Turkey showed slow steps but the 
progress functions step by step. This is a positive development. 
If we are to evaluate the developments; Turkey is on the right 
dimension and the nation is in a progress. On the other hand, 
some areas were not touched upon in the progress. These areas 
                                                          
74 November 14 2001, Hürriyet 
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are certain. Because of this, our prior aim should be to deal with 
these untouched areas”75.  
 
 
4.3.3 The European Commission’s Regular Progress Reports on Turkey (1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001) 
As is mentioned before, “the Progress Reports analyze to what degree the 1993 
Copenhagen Criteria are fulfilled by the candidate states” (Usul, 2002: 14). In order 
to measure the ability of the candidate states in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, 
the European Commission prepares annually reports and in these reports, the 
positive developments and shortcomings are enumerated in the fields of politics and 
the economy. Therefore, the candidate states are informed of their shortcomings and 
the necessity of dealing with shortcoming is expected by the Union in order to be a 
full member. In other words, these reports examine the candidate states’ ability to 
take on the obligations of membership and in the end, the reports give the annual 
general evaluation of the candidate’s prospects on the way to accession with 
particular reference to European enlargement strategy. When all the reports 
(1998,1999,2000,and 2001) are carefully examined, the expectation of the Union 
especially on the political criteria and the response of Turkey to these expectations 
and the gap between them clearly show themselves.  
 
 
                                                          
75 A special statement from Verheugen to NTV. The member of the European Commission 
responsible for enlargement, Gunter Verheugen, answers the questions of Murat Akgün, Ankara  
representative of NTV. The full text of this statement can be found at 
ntvmsnbc.com/news/136085.asp. 
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4.3.3.1 1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession  
The first regular report of the Commission was submitted in 1998. “The Cardiff 
European Council, which took place in June 1998, welcomed the Commission’s 
confirmation that it will submit at the end of 1998 its first regular reports on each 
candidate’s progress towards accession” (Regular Report from the Commission on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession -1998-, p: 4).  
 
“The Progress Report on Turkey in 1998 is the first significant work on Turkey by 
the Union that evaluates the political regime of Turkey” (Usul, 2002, p: 14). This 
document analyzes the relations between Turkey and the Union and analyzes the 
situation both with regard to both the political and economic conditions. The 
significant part for Turkey is the political one, in which democracy, rule of law, 
human rights and protection of minorities are dealt with.  
 
It is stated in the report that; 
“Turkey has a government and Parliament resulting from multi-party, democratic 
elections and the administration capable of framing and applying legislation 
compatible with the acquis communautaire. Despite political recognition of the need 
for improvement…Turkey’s record of upholding the rights on the individual and the 
freedom of expression falls well short of standards in the EU” (p:9).  
 
Therefore, although Turkey has a multi-party system and democratic elections, there 
are also some problematic areas as is stated in the chapter on Civic and Political 
Rights. It is stated that ,“the actual upholding of civil and political rights enshrined in 
the Turkish Constitution and law remains problematic” (p:14). These problematic 
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areas are enumerated as torture, disappearances, freedom of expression, freedom of 
press, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and capital punishment.  
 
Other than these issues, there is one more important shortcoming mentioned in the 
document, which also remains problematic today. This issue shows itself under the 
heading of Minority Rights and Protection of Minorities.  
According to the Report;  
“the Constitution does not recognize Kurds as a national, racial or ethnic minority. 
There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds’ participation in political and economic 
affairs but Kurds who publicly or politically assert their Kurdish ethnic identity risk 
harassment or prosecution…the Turkish authorities do not recognize the existence of 
a Kurdish minority, considering them to be simply Turks of Kurdish origin” (p: 20).  
 
This remains as the basic problem and the solution is the “recognition of certain 
forms of Kurdish cultural identity and the greater tolerance of the ways of 
expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism” 
(p:20).  
 
4.3.3.2 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession 
According to the 1999 report, there are still problems in Turkey that give cause for 
concern in the political criteria. “The situation described in the last Regular Report 
has not substantially changed. Nevertheless, Turkey has taken some steps which 
clearly go in the right direction”(p:11). For instance, there were some developments 
in detention procedures, the measures against the practice of torture and extra 
judicial executions.  
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Despite the positive gestures made by Turkish authorities, the situation regarding the 
“Kurdish question” remains worrying for the Report. There was no development on 
the cultural rights of these people. “For instance, TV broadcasting in Kurdish, while 
apparently tolerated for non-political programs, is still officially not allowed” (p:14). 
As said by the document;   
“the essential point is that any such group [Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin] 
should have the opportunity and material resource to use and sustain its natural 
languages and cultural traditions in circumstances and under conditions  now clearly 
and reasonably defined by two important Council of Europe Conventions: the 
Framework Convention on Protection of National minorities and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages…” (p: 14).  
 
 
As a general evaluation of the Report, it is stated that “…although the basic features 
of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen 
political criteria. There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and 
protection of minorities” (p:15).  
 
4.3.3.3 2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession 
This report refers to some positive developments in Turkey, such as in the area of 
torture. It also praises Turkey for signing of two major international instruments in 
the field of human rights, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. “The 
European Commission welcomes these various initiatives, which will bring forward 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. It encourages Turkey to make concrete progress as 
soon as possible…” (p:11).  
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On the other hand, “the problems in the area of civil and political rights identified in 
last year’s regular report remain largely unchanged, and only limited progress can be 
made” (p:15). Additional to the language problem, more specifically the broadcast 
issue in a language other than Turkish and an education issue were introduced in this 
report. According to the report,  
“as far as the use of languages other than Turkish is concerned, no particular 
problems have been reported for citizens belonging to minorities covered by the 
1923 Lausanne Treaty. However, for those belonging to groups that are outside the 
scope of the Lausanne Treaty the situation has not improved, notably concerning 
TV/radio-broadcasting and education. …In practice, some broadcasting in Kurdish 
is sometimes tolerated. In the field of education, no language other than Turkish is 
allowed for teaching purposes, except where explicitly authorized by the Ministry of 
National Education. Neither legislation nor practice should prevent the enjoyment of 
cultural rights for all Turks irrespective of their ethnic origin” (p: 18).  
 
Therefore, the Report criticizes Turkey for not granting cultural rights of the 
“Turkish citizens with Kurdish origin”. These people are presented as different 
people with different features such as culture and language. And therefore, these 
differences should be respected and not only the broadcasting rights but also the 
education rights should be given in Kurdish.  
 
These cultural rights are considered as primary criteria for the improvement of the 
situation in Turkey and also for the improvement on the road of accession. 
 “compared to last year, the economic, social and cultural rights situation has not 
improved, particularly when it comes to the enjoyment of cultural rights for all 
Turks irrespective of ethnic origin. The situation in the Southeast, where the 
population is predominantly Kurdish, has not substantially changed” (p:21).  
 
Therefore, the political situation has hardly improved and thus, Turkey still does not 
meet the Copenhagen political criteria, which is a core condition in the accession 
strategy of the Union.  
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4.3.3.4 2001 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession 
In this report, similar to the previous ones, some positive remarks have been made 
such as the National Program and the constitutional amendments. It is stated that the 
National Program is a welcomed situation and additionally, “the recent 
constitutional amendments are a significant step towards strengthening guarantees in 
the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and limiting capital 
punishment” (p:19).  
 
As in the previous reports, the fields of civil and political rights and human rights 
and protection of minorities remain as the core issues. The recent developments 
were welcomed but on the other hand, the implementation of these developments 
and changes are important. In this regard, civil and political rights in Turkey need 
improvement. Therefore, according to the report,  
“for persons belonging to groups that are outside the scope of the 1923 Lausanne 
treaty, the actual situation has not improved, notably in relation to broadcasting and 
education…in the field of education no language other than Turkish is allowed…and 
no amendments under the constitutional reform provides for education in languages 
other than Turkish” (p: 28).  
 
As a general evaluation, the constitutional amendments are considered as a 
significant step towards accession. However, attention turned into the effective 
implementation of these important changes. Despite these changes, a number of 
restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms have remained. That is to say, 
there has been no improvement in the real enjoyment of cultural rights for all Turks, 
irrespective of their ethnic origin, according to the report.  
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As a short conclusion of these reports, in order for Turkey to satisfy the political 
accession criteria, it has to first allow education and TV/radio-broadcasting in the 
mother tongue of all its ethnic, religious, language and cultural groups and especially 
Kurds, and secondly, it has to find a political solution for the “Southeastern 
question” and this solution seems to be the recognition of the “Kurdish identity”.  
 
In the course of writing this thesis, regarding above-mentioned political necessities, 
Turkish Parliament passed a reform package on Saturday, August 3, 2002, which 
abolishes the death penalty in peacetime and which allows broadcasting and 
education in mother tongue. In the framework of political criteria in the integration 
process, according to the reform package: 
• The death penalty has been scrapped and the heaviest penalty has become life 
imprisonment without parole. The death penalty has been maintained only for 
war crimes.  
• The minorities established by the Treaty of Lausanne will be allowed to 
purchase real estate to satisfy their cultural, religious, educational, social and 
health needs through their foundations.  
• Turkish citizens will be allowed to make broadcasts in their own mother 
tongue. This means language broadcasts will be allowed in such languages as 
Kurdis, Laz and Cherkez.  
  
 
 
110
• Citizens will be allowed to open courses in the mother tongues being used in 
Turkey, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. Special Kurdish 
courses will be allowed.76 
 
The motivation for this reform package was that “the EU will publish a review on 
Turkish progress toward membership negotiations in October and continuously 
update it until the Dec 12-13 Summit in Copenhagen, Denmark” (TDN, August 7, 
2002. p: 4). At this summit, it will be certain that whether membership negotiations 
with Turkey will start or not. Because of this, the Turkish Parliament passed this 
package with all possible speed. In this perspective, Turkish officials expect “EU to 
set a date for starting its membership talks at summit” and expect these reforms to be 
positively reflected in the next progress report by the Union (TDN, August 5, 2002. 
p:1).  
 
It is a fact that the Union is happy about the reforms. “Gunter Verheugen 
congratulated the Turkish Parliament for the ‘brave decision’” (TDN, August 5, 
2002. p:1). This is seen by the Union as the sign of determination of Turkey towards 
further alignment with the values and standards of the European Union. It is the first 
general impression that this package as a whole constitutes an important step in the 
direction of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria.  
 
On the other hand, the EU officials state that “Turkey had made big progress with 
reforms but this is not enough to reach the Copenhagen Political Criteria” (TDN, 
                                                          
76 Turkish Daily News, August 6, 2002. p:3 
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August 6, 2002. p:3). “European Union officials said Turkey still has a long road 
ahead before it can join their club” (TDN, August 7, 2002. p:14). This means that the 
Union wants to see the practice of the reforms. As Verheugen states, “much will 
depend on its practical implementation that will be closely monitored in the months 
to come” (TDN, August 5, 2002. p:16). What can be inferred is that, although Turkey 
demonstrates its determination to negotiate EU membership, the reform package will 
not automatically bring negotiations. In this regard, a quick implementation of these 
reforms is required in order to be positively reflected in the Copenhagen Summit.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear that the European Union attaches great importance to the concepts of 
human rights and democratic principles. In other words, the Union, at least at the 
formal and legal level, has concerns about democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law in both its domestic and external affairs. In this regard, in the Treaty on 
European Union (TEC), Title 1 Common Provisions, Article 6, it is laid down that; 
“the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law…”. Secondly, coupled with the 
TEC, the Treaty establishing the European Community sets out the provision in 
respect to human rights within Title XX. Article 177 spells out that the “Community 
policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms”.  
 
Apart from these priorities in the internal level, in the enlargement process, in other 
words, in the relations with third parties, the Union continues this tendency by 
putting the Copenhagen Criteria as a sine qua non condition for full membership. 
Basically, the candidate nations for full membership must satisfy stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities. The Union expects these principles first to be accepted 
and second put into practice in daily life. The Copenhagen Criteria is the first and 
basic expectation of the Union from the candidate nations. This document constitutes 
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the seed of integration, and this shows how much the Union attaches importance to 
these principles.  
 
When Turkey’s responses with regard to putting these principles into practice is 
examined, there are clearly problematic findings. Some expectations, specifically the 
expectations on cultural rights are seen as dangerous and are considered as threats for 
the maintenance of the territorial unity and indivisible integrity of the nation. In this 
regard, for Turkey the West is both the source of salvation and threat. This paradox 
has not been solved yet and basically it will not be able to be solved until the fear of 
dissolution or separation is eliminated in Turkey. The continuation of a monolithic 
understanding of citizenship, the strong state tradition in Turkey and the fear of 
separation seems to be the most important problems in this integration process. 
Without overcoming the problem of continuation of the state tradition, the needs of 
the people cannot be realized.  
 
Additionally, in terms of cultural rights, Turkey has some fears and reservations on 
this regard. The original understanding of Constitutional citizenship, which protects 
different identities in the nation, is not applicable in Turkey. In this sense, Turkey is 
not included in the multicultural tradition of the Western world. Therefore, Turkey’s 
monolithic understanding of citizenship is seen as another main obstacle in the 
solution of the minority issue in the European integration process.  
 
Regarding the above-mentioned fear, it is worth mentioning that the claims and 
demands on human rights and especially on cultural rights, such as education in the 
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mother tongue, are conceived as threats for the existence of the state and the unity of 
the nation. The demands on these issues are considered as a conspiracy supported by 
the West and because of this characteristic, they are perceived as threats for the 
integrity and the security of the nation. However, tens of years of terrorism have 
politicized the issue of human rights and also the demands on human rights.  
 
Looked at from another angle, human rights is a mechanism of constructing and 
protecting the social peace. It is a mechanism that prevents social disorder and clash, 
not one that causes social clashes. For that reason, there is a need to redefine human 
rights as a core value by both political and social spheres in Turkey to approach EU 
standards.  
 
Future Prospects 
This reconsideration of human rights must be in conformity with the understanding 
that the models hindering freedom of thought, excluding different styles of lives and 
identities are not the way to protect the integrity and security of the nation. The 
security of the nation requires accepting the freedom of different styles of thought 
within the nation. Today, security is possible with more freedoms and more welfare. 
Unnecessary fears and lack of confidence are not appropriate given the necessities of 
the 21st century. In this perspective, the latest reform package passed by the Turkish 
Parliament is the clear sign that Turkey has realized these necessities and also is a 
sign of ability of Turkey to make necessary changes in compliance with European 
norms and standards. On the other hand, although this reform package is a very 
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positive and brave decision, it is not enough for further integration, in such a way 
that the Union wants to see quick implementation of them.  
 
That is to say, these new laws are extremely important for Turkey, not only because 
they will bring it closer to the European Union, but also because they will enable 
Turkey to live in peace, all together, under the guidance of liberal democratic 
principles, the most developed rules of coexistence mankind has realized thus far in 
history. The recognition of different identities and cultures does not and should not 
bring separation. On the contrary, from the perspective of Turkey, the “recognized” 
people feel more integrated into the country to which they already belonged.  
 
In this respect, the demands coming from the European Union are in conformity with 
the necessities of the 21st century. The demands basically can be conceived as ways 
of providing a healthy sphere for different ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural 
groups to live together compliant with the necessities of multiculturalism. Therefore, 
Turkey should respond to this demand accepting that the notion of “one state, one 
nation” is more a fiction than a reality. There are always differentiations of ideas and 
beliefs. What is important is to accept such realities and search for a new social 
contract in which the cultural mosaic of Turkey can flourish.  
  
 
 
116
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
1. III. Osmanlı Sempozyumu. 1989, Söğüt. Ankara: Ertuğrul Gazi’yi 
Anma ve Söğüt Şenliği Vakfı Yayınları. 
 
2. Akyüz, Vecdi. 1999. Osmanlı’da Devlet İlişkileri (State Relations in 
the Ottomans). İstanbul: Ayışığıkitapları. 
 
 
3. Ashcraft, R. 1987. Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, UK: Unwin 
Hyman Ltd. 
 
4. Ataöv, Türkkaya (ed.). 2001. The Armanians in the Late Ottoman 
Period. Ankara: The Council of Culture, Arts And Publications. 
 
5. Bader, Veit (ed). 1997. Citizenship and Exclusion. London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
6. Borja, Jordi, “The Citizenship Question and the Challenge of 
Globalization”, City, 4, 1, (2000). 
 
7. Bozkurt, Gülnihal. 1989. Gayrimüslim Osmanlı Vatandaşlarının 
Hukuki Durumu (The Juridical Status of the Non-Muslim Citizens of 
the Ottoman Empire). Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. 
 
 
8. Brölman, Catherine. 1993. Peoples and Minorities in International 
Law. London: Martinus Nijholf Publishers. 
 
9. Cassese, Antonio. 1995. Self-Determination of Peoples. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
10. Clark D., Williamson R. 1996. Self-Determination International 
Perspectives. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
11. Cleude, L, Inis. 1969. National Minorities An International Problem. 
Westprot, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers. 
 
12. Cornell, Eric. 1998. Türkiye Avrupa’nın Eşiğinde (Turkey Is on the 
Threshold of the Europe). İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi. 
 
 
13. Çavuşoğlu, Naz. 1999. Uluslararası İnsan Hakları Hukukunda Azınlık 
Hakları (Rights of Minorities in the International Law of Human 
Rights). Ankara : Su Yayınları.  
  
 
 
117
 
 
14. Delanty, Gerard, “Models of Citizenship: Defining European Identity 
and Citizenship”, Citizenship Studies, 1, 3, (1997). 
 
15. Delgado-Moreira, Juan. 2000. Multicultural Citizenship of the 
European Union. England: Ashgate. 
 
16. Duner, Bertil and Edward Deverell, “Country Cousin: Turkey, the 
European Union and Human Rights”, Turkish Studies, 2, 1, (Spring 
2000). 
 
17. Eroğul, Cem, “Altıncı Anayasa Değişikliği”, Mülkiye, XXV, 231, 
(2002). 
 
18. Finkel, Andrew and Nükhet Sırman (eds). 1990. Turkish State, 
Turkish Society. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
19. Fottrell, Deidre and Bill Bowring (eds). 1999. Minority and Group 
Rights in the New Millenium. London: Martinus Nijholf Publishers. 
 
 
20. Gilbert, P. 2000. Peoples, Cultures and Nations in Political 
Philosophy. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
21. Grant, W.R. 1987. John Locke’s Liberalism. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
 
22. Haller, Bruna, Hans Christian and Herbert Petzold (eds). 2000. Law in 
Greater Europe. London: Kluwer Law International.  
 
23. Hanlı, Hakan, “The European and Turkish Challenge: a New Europe 
for all Its Citizens”, Insight Turkey, 3, 1, (January-March 2001). 
 
24. Hannum, Hurst. 1990. Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
Determination. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
25. Holmes, Leslie (ed.). 1999. Citizenship and Identity in Europe. 
England: Ashgate. 
 
 
26. Horton, John. 1993. Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration. New 
York: St Martin’s Press. 
 
 
27. Heper, Metin. 1985. State Tradition in Turkey. North Humbersi: 
Eothen Press. 
  
 
 
118
 
 
28. -----------------. 1988. State Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s. Berlin, New York: Wakter de Gruyter. 
 
29. İnalcık, Halil. 1973. The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-
1600. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
 
 
30. ----------------.1982. Turkish Jewish Relations in the Ottoman Empire. 
Chicago: A United Turkish American Publication. 
 
31. ---------------. 1993. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Ottoman Empire). 
İstanbul: Eren yayıncılık. 
 
32. ---------------. Tanzimat Nedir? (What is Tanzimat?) 
 
 
33. İçduygu, Ahmet. March-April 1995: Türkiye Günlüğü, 33. 
Çokkültürlülük: Türkiye Vtandaşlığı Kavramı İçin Toplumsal Bir 
Zemin. 
 
34. İçduygu, Ahmet, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan Soyarık. October 1999. 
Middle Eastern Studies, 35:4. What is the Matter with Citizenship? A 
Turkish Debate. 
 
35. İçduygu, Ahmet and Fuat Keyman. November-December-January 
1998-1999. Doğu Batı, 5. Globalleşme, Anayasallık ve Türkiye’de 
Vatandaşlık Tartılması. 
 
36. Jenkins, Brian and Spyros A. Sofos (eds). 1996. Nation and Identity in 
Contemporary Europe. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
 
37. Kedoure, Sylvia (ed). 1996. Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics. 
London: Frans Cass. 
 
38. Koçoğlu, Yahya. 2001. Azınlık Gençleri Anlatıyor (Minority Youth 
are Telling). İstanbul: Metiş Yayınları. 
 
 
39. Kymlicka, Will. 1995a. Multinational Citizenship. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
40. ---------------. 1995b. The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
  
 
 
119
41. La Torre, Massimo. 1998. European Citizenship. London: Kluver Law 
International. 
 
 
42. Laski, Harold J. 1936. The Rise of European Liberalism. London: 
George Allen and Unwin. 
 
43. Lemke, Christiane, “Citizenship and European Integration”, World 
Affairs, 160, 4, (Spring 1998). 
 
44. Lewis, Geoffrey. 1974. Modern Turkey. London: Ernest Benn 
Limited. 
 
45. Locke, J. 1980.Second Treatise of Government, Edited by G.B. 
Macpherson, Originally Printed in 1960, Hackett Publishing 
Company, Cambridge.  
 
46. Loloğlu, Faruk, “Helsinki’nin Birince Yılında Türkiye-AB İlişkileri”, 
Mülkiye, XXV, 226, (2001). 
 
 
47. Mann, M. 1990.The Rise and Decline of The Nation-State. Oxford: 
Basill, Blackwell. 
 
 
48. Marshall, T. H. and Tom Bottomore. 1992. Citizenship and Social 
Class. London: Pluto Press. 
 
 
49. Mayall, Simon V. 1997. Turkey: Thwarted Ambition. Washington: 
INSS. 
 
50. Meehan, Elizabeth. 1993. Citizenship and the European Community. 
London: Sage. 
 
51. Miall, Hugh (ed). 1994. Minority Rights in Europe. London: Pinter 
Publishers.  
 
52. Oran, Baskın. 2000. Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar (Globalization and 
Minorities). Ankara: İmaj Yayıncılık. 
 
 
53. Özbudun, Ergun. 1998. Türk Anayasa Hukuku (Turkish Constitutional 
Law). Ankara: Yetkin Yayınları. 
 
 
54. ---------------------. 1999. Contemporary Turkish Politics. London: 
Lynne Rienner. 
  
 
 
120
 
55. Parmaksızoğlu, İsmet. 1982. Türklerde Devlet Anlayışı (The 
Understanding of the State in Turks). Ankara: Başbakanlık Yayınevi. 
 
56. Peters, Richard. 1959. The Story of the Turks From Empire to 
Democracy. New York: C.S. Publishing Company. 
 
 
57. Preece, J.J. 1998. National Minorities and the European Nation-States 
System. Oxford: Claredon Press.  
 
58. Rex, J. 1996. Ethnic Minorities and the Modern Nation State. London: 
Macmillan Press. 
 
59. Sanjian, Avedis K. 1965. The Armanian Communities in Syria Under 
Ottoman Domination. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
60. Shaw, Stanford J. 1977. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern 
Turkey: Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
61. --------------------. 1982. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye 
(History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey). İstanbul: E 
Yayınları. 
 
62. ------------------. 2000. Studies in Ottoman And Turkish History: Life 
With the Ottomans. Istanbul: ISIS Press. 
 
 
63. Smith, D, Anthony. 1992. Ethnicity and Nationalism. Laiden, New 
York, Köln: E. J. Brill.  
 
64. Soykan, Tankut T. 1999. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Gayrımüslimler 
(Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire). İstanbul: Ütopya Yayınevi. 
 
65. Şen, Serdar. 1996. Silahlı Kuvvetler ve Modernizasyon (Military 
Forces and Modernization). İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi. 
 
66. Tezcan, Nuran. 1994. Atatürk’ün yazdığı Yurttaşlık Bilgileri 
(Citizenship Information Written by Atatürk). İstanbul: Çağdaş 
Yayınları. 
 
67. The Protection of Minorities, The Council of Europe Press. 
68. Thornberry, Patric. 1991. International Law and the Rights of 
Minorities. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
69. Tivey, Leonard (ed). 1981. The Nation-State: The Formation Of 
Modern Politics. New York: St. Martin’s. 
  
 
 
121
 
70. Tomuschat, Christian. 1993. Modern Law of Self-Determination. 
London: Martinus Nıjhoff Publishers. 
 
71. Turner, Bryan and Peter Hamilton (eds). 1994. Citizenship Critical 
Concepts. London and New York: Roudledge. 
 
72. Türkiye’de İnsan Hakları (Human Rights in Turkey). 2000. Türkiye ve 
Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü. Ankara: TODAİE. 
 
73. Üstel, Füsun. 1999. Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi (Citizenship and 
Democracy). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları. 
 
74. Vakkasoğlu, Yetkin. 1999. Osmanlı İnsanı (Ottoman People). 
İstanbul: Nesil Basım Yayın. 
 
75. Verheugen, Günter, “Prospects for Turkey’s Accession to the EU”, 3, 
3, (April-June 2001). 
 
 
76. Watson, Michalel (ed). 1990. Contemporary Minority Nationalism. 
London and New York: Routledge.  
 
77. Whitaker, Ben (ed). 1984. Minorities: A Question of Human Rights?. 
Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
 
 
78. Woolf, Stuard (ed). 1996. Nationalism in Europe 1815 to the Present. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
79. Yetkin, Çetin. 1992. Türkiye’nin Devlet Yaşamında Yahudiler (Jews in 
the Türkish State). İstanbul: Afa Yayınları. 
 
80. Zürcher, Eric J. 1994. Turkey: A Modern History. London: I.B Tauris 
& Co Ltd. 
 
Documents and Newspapers  
1. American Declaration of Independence (1776) 
2. Commission of the European Communities, “1998 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. 
3. Commission of the European Communities, “1999 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. 
  
 
 
122
4. Commission of the European Communities, “2000 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. 
5. Commission of the European Communities, “2001 Regular Report on 
Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession”. 
6. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
7. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
8. Cumhuriyet, 15 February 2002. 
9. Cumhuriyet, 25 March 2001. 
10. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples 
11. French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
12. Hürriyet, 14 November 2001. 
13. Hürriyet, 22 February 2002 
14. Hürriyet, 30 January 2002. 
15. Radikal, 6 February 2002. 
16. Radikal, 20 March 2001. 
17. The Accession Partnership Document 
18. The Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 
19. The Copenhagen Document of the European Council 
20. The Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
21. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
22. The Declaration on the Rights of the People Belonging to National, Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 
23. The European Convention of Human Rights 
  
 
 
123
24. The European Union Strategy Paper 2000. 
25. The Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities 
26. The National Program of Turkey 
27. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
28. The Treaty of Maastricht 
29. The Treaty of Paris (1763) 
30. The United Nations Charter 
31. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
32. Treaty of Lausanne 
33. Turkish Constitution 
34. Turkish Daily News, August 5, 2002. 
35. Turkish Daily News, August 6, 2002. 
36. Turkish Daily News, August 7, 2002. 
37. UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 
 
 
